A retrospective review of the most common safety concerns encountered at a range of international recompression facilities when applying the Risk Assessment Guide for Recompression Chambers over a period of 13 years by Burman, Francois
   Page 1 of 59 
A retrospective review of the most common safety concerns 
encountered at a range of international recompression 
facilities when applying the Risk Assessment Guide for 
Recompression Chambers over a period of 13 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Francois Burman 
April 2014
Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Science in Baromedical Sciences in the Faculty of Medicine 
and Health Sciences at Stellenbosch University
Supervisor: Dr. Willem Albertus Jacobus Meintjes 
 
   Page 2 of 59 
Declaration 
 
By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained 
therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent 
explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch 
University will not infringe any third party rights, and that I have not previously in its entirety 
or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification. 
 
 
April 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2014 Stellenbosch University 
 
All rights reserved 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   Page 3 of 59 
Abstract  
Diving medical doctors frequently make use of Hyperbaric Facilities without fully realising 
their legal and ethical responsibilities towards the safety of their patients and their staff. Few 
have specific training in the technical or operational aspects of these facilities; this deficiency 
is exacerbated when these are established in remote areas.  The potential dangers are real and 
the results can be devastating. Most current regulatory, manufacturing, safety and operational 
guidance documents are not flexible enough to be applied universally, nor do they offer 
practical guidance on the recognition and the mitigation of the unique and relevant hazards at 
a given facility. The goal of integrated safety is rarely achieved. 
The Risk Assessment Guide (RAG) was developed by the investigator as a tool to qualify the 
actual safety status of a hyperbaric facility and to offer guidance on how to improve and 
maintain it. Although the RAG has been subject to extensive peer review and field 
implementation over the past 13 years, it has not been subject to scientific validation. 
Therefore, the objective of this thesis was to do so by (1) retrospectively reviewing the most 
common safety concerns affecting facility status as identified by the RAG; (2) using the data 
derived from the analysis to produce a predictive model of likely safety status for un-assessed 
facilities; and (3) consolidating the results in the form of specific recommendations to 
improve and maintain safety status. 
Data collected from a consistent application of the RAG over a period of 13 years, covering 
105 applicable facilities, was analysed to determine the common safety concerns, particularly 
those affecting safety status by means of a consolidated Risk Assessment Score (RAS). The 
RAS values permitted comparisons between the facilities assessed. The various factors 
associated with a higher RAS were determined by means of a multivariate regression. 
Thereupon, the most significant determinant factors were built into a predictive model for the 
likely safety status of an un-assessed facility. Finally, the most common safety concerns were 
identified and summarised so that medical practitioners are empowered to determine, 
improve and maintain the safety status of a given facility. 
The conclusions of this project are that: (1) the RAG is an appropriate tool to assess facilities 
for risk elements relevant to their safety status while simultaneously filling the knowledge 
gaps to equip medical practitioners and staff to improve and maintain safety; (2) reliable 
predictions on unknown facilities can be made to provide medical practitioners with the 
necessary information on whether a given facility is appropriate for patient referral; and (3) 
the RAG is a suitable benchmark for determining hyperbaric facility safety; the review of its 
application has provided objective data that will permit the formulation of future safety 
guidelines based on empirical rather than arbitrary information. 
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Opsomming 
Duikmediese dokters maak dikwels gebruik van hiperbariese fasiliteite sonder om die wetlike 
en etiese verantwoordelikhede ten opsigte van die veiligheid van hul pasiënte en personeel te 
besef. Weinig het spesifieke opleiding in die tegniese of operasionele aspekte van hierdie 
fasiliteite; hierdie tekort is gewoonlik erger in afgeleë gebiede. Die potensiële gevare is 
wesenlik en die gevolge kan verwoestend wees. Meeste van die huidige regulatoriese-, 
vervaardigings-, veiligheids en operasionele leidingsdokumente is nie buigsaam genoeg om 
in die algemeen toegepas te kan word nie.  Hulle bied ook nie praktiese leiding oor die 
erkenning en die versagting van unieke en relevante gevare by 'n gegewe fasiliteit nie. Die 
doelwit van geïntegreerde veiligheid word selde bereik. 
Die “Risk Asssessment Guide” (RAG) is voorheen deur die navorser ontwikkel as 'n 
instrument om die werklike veiligheidsstatus van 'n hiperbariese fasiliteit te kwantifiseer en 
leiding te bied oor hoe om dit te verbeter en in stand te hou. Alhoewel die RAG onderhewig 
was aan uitgebreide eweknie hersiening en praktiese uitvoering oor die afgelope 13 jaar, was 
dit nie voorheen onderhewig aan wetenskaplike validasie nie. Die doelwit van hierdie tesis is 
dus om hierdie te bewerkstellig deur (1) die mees algemene veiligheidskommernisse wat 
fasiliteitstatus beïnvloed, soos deur die RAG geïdentifiseer, retrospektiewelik te hersien; (2) 
die data wat deur die hersiening verkry is te gebruik om 'n model te ontwikkel vir 
onbeoordeelde fasiliteite, wat die waarskynlike veiligheidsstatus kan voorspel, en (3) die 
resultate te konsolideer in die vorm van spesifieke aanbevelings om veiligheidsstatus te 
verbeter en in stand te hou. 
Die data wat ingesamel is deur die konsekwente toepassing van die RAG oor 'n tydperk van 
13 jaar en wat 105 fasiliteite gedek het, is ontleed om die algemene veiligheidskommernisse, 
veral die wat die veiligheidsstatus beïnvloed, deur middel van 'n gekonsolideerde Risiko-
assesserings waarde (RAW) te bepaal. Die duidelike en aangepaste RAW laat toe om 
vergelykings tussen die fasiliteite te tref. Faktore wat verband hou met 'n hoër RAW was deur 
middel van 'n meervoudige regressie bepaal. Daarna is die belangrikste determinante in 'n 
voorspellende model gebou om die waarskynlike veiligheidsstatus van 'n onbeoordeelde 
fasiliteit te bepaal. Ten slotte was die mees algemene veiligheidskommernisse geïdentifiseer 
en opgesom om sodoende mediese praktisyns te bemagtig om die veiligheidsstatus van 'n 
gegewe fasiliteit vas te stel, te verbeter en in stand te hou. 
Die gevolgtrekkings van hierdie projek is dat: (1) die RAG 'n geskikte instrument is om 
fasiliteite te evalueer vir risiko-elemente wat relevant is tot hul eie veiligheidsstatus en 
terselfdertyd die kennisgapings te vul om geneeshere en personeel toe te rus om veiligheid te 
verbeter en in stand te hou; (2) redelik betroubare voorspellings oor onbekende fasiliteite kan 
gemaak word om vir mediese praktisyns die nodige inligting te verskaf aangaande die 
geskiktheid van 'n gegewe fasiliteit vir pasiënt-verwysing, en (3) dat die RAG 'n geskikte 
maatstaf is vir die bepaling van hiperbariese fasiliteit veiligheid.  Die hersiening van die 
toepassing het objektiewe data voorsien wat die formulering van toekomstige 
veiligheidsriglyne, geskoei op empiriese eerder as arbitrêre inligting, sal toelaat. 
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Chapter 1: Background, introduction and literature review 
Background 
Hyperbaric facilities for the treatment of diving illnesses first appeared in historical 
recollections in 1885 during the tunnelling work being done under the Hudson River in New 
York.  This was the first recorded successful use of pressure in the treatment of what was 
then known as “caisson’s disease”.1  As the range of work under pressure expanded from 
compressed air caissons to professional compressed gas diving, therapeutic recompression 
facilities inevitably followed in its wake. However,  apart from several ambitious “cure-all” 
efforts by medical doctors during the early years, it was really the work by German 
submarine and military diving divisions that spear-headed the development of Hyperbaric 
Facilities for the recompression of divers presenting with symptoms of decompression 
illness.2   
Although demands for commercial diving continued to grow, the harsh conditions and 
primitive diving equipment did little to encourage diving as a sport. That was until the 
introduction of self-contained underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA) by Jacques-Yves 
Cousteau who originally developed his famous ‘demand valve’ regulator for military 
applications during World War II. Suddenly diving was within reach of amateur enthusiasts 
and recreational diving received its initial kick-start in the late 1940’s.  Combined with the 
rapid growth of hyperbaric oxygen therapy from the mid 1950’s, diver recompression 
facilities began to appear and spread around the world as the boom of air travel offered access 
to remote and exotic diving locations. This pursuit of unspoilt, remote dive destinations 
continues to this day. Consequently, many diving injuries occur in remote locations poorly 
prepared for these emergencies. Not infrequently the emotional impact of a severe case of 
decompression illness in these remote locations becomes the stimulus for setting up a local 
recompression facility. Often such facilities are built on impulse, outside the support of 
healthcare facilities, using rudimentary reconfigured military or commercial equipment, and 
with only volunteer divers as staff and variable medical coverage for support. The reliability 
and sustainability of these facilities is frequently dubious, the training frequently marginal, 
and the safety standards highly variable. These concerns were specifically mentioned at 
separate meetings (unpublished) of the Southern African Undersea and Hyperbaric Medical 
Association and the International Divers Alert Network.  Concerns have also been expressed 
in the literature.3, 4 For health professionals and diving safety organizations needing to refer 
injured divers to such facilities, it became essential to find a means of assessing the 
appropriateness of such recompression facilities for a given diving emergency. This need 
formed a major stimulus for the development of the Risk Assessment Guide.5 
As evidence for the beneficial application of recompression therapy continued to increase, it 
eventually became ‘standard practice’ in commercial and military diving. Not surprisingly, as 
recreational diving took off, so did the need for recompression. In lieu of proper training and 
regulations, diving accidents were quite common in the early years.  Eventually, industry 
standards, safety practices and formalised training for recreational divers developed 
organically around the world. Originally based on trial and error (experience) and tradition, 
arbitrary precautions and ‘common sense’ practices ultimately became more refined by the 
dissemination of medical information and standardised training.  Still, injuries and breaches 
in safety have continued to plague the industry, prompting the development of ever more 
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specific safety practices and standards based on the chamber manufacturers’ interpretation of 
the requirements set by the medical industry and regulatory authorities.  
Even today, the interpretation of safety standards and how they translate to actual operational, 
training and safety practices remain alarmingly inconsistent across the globe6.  Many 
countries have partially applicable standards and regulations in place, based on issues such as 
fire prevention, occupational health and safety, and pressure vessel design. However, these 
generic standards leave much to the imagination. Indeed, in the absence of an absolute need 
for them, surprisingly few countries have had the necessary incentive to develop effective 
regulatory standards and codes. Where needs have arisen, they have typically been in 
response to concerns about unsafe or unethical medical practices; a demand for fair economic 
enterprise; or sadly, often a catastrophic accident demanding statutory intervention.  Even 
then, most guidance documents for safety in hyperbaric facilities were based on commercial 
and military diving. Their ‘industrial’ approach was usually inappropriate for patients (i.e. 
non-commercial or military divers) receiving medical treatments, since most patients – 
including injured recreational divers – are completely unfamiliar with recompression until 
they need it themselves. Moreover, most commercial and military facilities are not designed 
for clinical applications; even simple things like moving patients in and out of pressure locks 
can become a dangerous and backbreaking affair. It seems odd that the health and safety 
standards applicable to a recognised medical therapy in such regular use around the world 
would be so poorly defined. Yet they were. 
In almost all countries, hyperbaric medicine (including recompression therapy for 
recreational diving injuries) is practiced by medical doctors. Of these, few are trained in the 
unique operational and technical equipment aspects required for safe and effective treatment.  
Relegating this responsibility to technical personnel or support staff without proper 
understanding or training has produced a false sense of security and ultimately resulted in 
several accidents – even in well-established medical Hyperbaric Facilities. Even as recently 
as 1997, an accident review of hyperbaric chamber fires reported that there were several 
cases where the responsibility for fire prevention was borne by people who were untrained or 
ill-equipped to do so.7 Nevertheless, this gap in awareness, training and proper delegation of 
authority and responsibility remains unresolved. Various standards, guidelines and 
regulations now exist, but this does not translate into a proper risk assessment with 
identification and mitigation of structural and operational deficiencies. These remain 
prevalent, particularly in unregulated or remote settings. 
Introduction to hyperbaric medicine & the risk assessment process 
Terminology 
Several terms are used in this thesis to describe the hyperbaric environment and variables 
related to risk and safety. In non-technical settings, many of these terms are used 
interchangeably or ambiguously. To avoid this, to ensure that this work is accessible even to 
those without a specific technical background, and to provide greater consistency, the 
following terms are defined here. The primary objectives are to prepare the reader in advance 
for the various instruments and metrics described elsewhere in the study and to carefully 
circumscribe the meanings assigned to them by the investigator.  The descriptions are 
deliberately succinct and for the purpose of clarity and contrast; they are not comprehensive, 
nor do they necessarily represent all the legal applications for their use. 
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 Code:  
A document containing minimum requirements to be met in order to assure safe 
construction or operation of a hyperbaric facility.  A code is usually produced with the 
intention of being enforced by a statutory body or agency; as such they are usually 
mandatory. 
 Chamber: 
A term to denote a pressure vessel for human occupancy. Depending on its purpose, 
the following adjectives may be added: hyperbaric- (i.e., when used primarily for 
clinical hyperbaric oxygen therapy), diving- (i.e., when used for operational diving 
support primarily) or recompression- (i.e., when used for the treatment of injured 
divers primarily). Most chambers perform more than one purpose. The term chamber 
refers only to the pressure vessel itself, whereas facility is used to include all 
associated support equipment and staff. 
 Hyperbaric Facility: 
For the purpose of this thesis, the term hyperbaric facility, is used throughout the text 
to identify the installation of a pressure vessel for human occupancy for medical 
purposes. This may include recompression treatment for injured divers or clinical 
hyperbaric oxygen therapy and encompasses all aspects of the facility, not only the 
pressure vessel. 
 Guideline:  
A document primarily published through industry participation in the interest of 
providing guidance or information, rather than being considered as a mandatory 
instrument. 
 Hazard:  
A potentially harmful situation or agent. Note that where a specific hazard introduces 
a specific risk at a specific hyperbaric facility, the term “risk element” (see below) or 
relevant hazard has been used to indicate this specificity. In the individual reports, the 
term “risk element” would therefore apply whereas in the collective findings these 
would be denoted as “hazards” with “risk element” in parentheses.  
 Multiplace and monoplace:  
Terms referring to the hyperbaric chamber type or design. Multiplace chambers have 
multiple pressurised compartments and can accommodate multiple occupants. These 
chambers generally have the ability to transfer occupants either into or out of the 
chamber, while the treatment compartment is under pressure. They are pressurised 
with air and the patients breath oxygen through a mask, head-tent or endotracheal 
tube. The staff tending the patients breathe air. This introduces the risk of developing 
decompression illness for which precautions must be taken. The terms multi-lock or 
multi-occupancy are used interchangeably. Monoplace chambers are typically but not 
always pressurised with oxygen. As the name suggests, they contain only one 
occupant – the patient. They are technically easier to install and operate although the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   Page 13 of 59 
use of 100% oxygen demands stringent safety precautions. The terms single-lock and 
single-occupancy are used interchangeably.  
 Non Compliance (NC): 
The failure of a hyperbaric facility to have adequately addressed, mitigated or 
otherwise contained a risk element in terms of the Risk Assessment Guide at the time 
of assessment.5, 8 
 Risk:  
The likelihood that exposure to a relevant hazard or risk element will lead to negative 
consequences.  
 Risk score (RS): 
A term specifically developed for and defined in this thesis as meaning the risk (as 
defined above) weighted by the frequency and consequences of a given exposure to 
the relevant hazard or risk element. The RS represents a summation and consolidation 
of the overall impact of a given non-compliance.  Although use of any relevant 
guideline or checklist might identify an NC, the actual impact on safety of a given NC 
can only be appreciated fully if the relevant hazard or risk element associated with the 
NC is factored into the assessment. The latter is the core objective for generating a 
RS: Essentially the RS provides a safety impact factor associated with a particular 
non-compliance. 
 Risk Assessment Score (RAS): 
A term specifically developed for and defined in this thesis as meaning the summation 
of all risk scores associated with individual non-compliances in order to provide a 
global reflection of the hyperbaric facility. 
 Risk element:  
A unique term created by the investigator to denote specific hazards introducing risks 
as they apply to the actual equipment, conditions or potential circumstances present at 
the specific hyperbaric facility being assessed at the time of assessment. In places it is 
used interchangeably with the term “relevant hazard” (see   “hazard” defined above). 
In the context of a specific facility assessment, discovery of a risk element represents 
a non-compliance. In order to maintain consistency in the identification and 
categorisation processes, risk elements are sub-divided into fire, mechanical or health 
risks. 
 Risk management:  
The deliberate and methodical process of eliminating, mitigating and managing 
exposure to hazards. 
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 Safe or safety: 
The classical meaning of the term safety implies the overall health and well-being of 
all staff, patients or other persons that may be present in the hyperbaric facility, as 
well as the integrity of the facility itself.  In the context of this thesis, safety represents 
a lasting state of variable duration in which adverse incidents, accidents, damage, 
injuries, illness or fatalities to both people and property are successfully avoided by 
means of appropriate precautionary measures. 
 Standard: 
A specification intended to be applied on a compulsory basis and seeking to ensure a 
safe outcome in the context of operational health and safety. 
 Statute: 
A legal instrument, enacted by a national legal system in a sovereign country or 
entity, providing compulsory instructions with regard to health and safety. 
 Sustainability: 
A determination as to whether a hyperbaric facility can continue to remain in 
operation indefinitely and be available to provide the defined scope of services as 
advertised or otherwise claimed.  
 Utilization: 
The frequency of use, determined as number of patients treated annually at a 
hyperbaric facility, specifically including any form of hyperbaric oxygen therapy.  
 User:  
The person or organisation that benefits either directly or indirectly from the 
utilisation of a hyperbaric facility. 
Risk assessment for hyperbaric facilities 
The risk assessment tool used in this study was developed by the investigator and first 
published as a “Risk Assessment Guide for Recompression Chambers” in 1998.5 Its 
development was in response to the need expressed by a diving safety organization and the 
Southern African Undersea and Hyperbaric Medical Association (SAUHMA).  The stated 
purpose was to guide medical doctors to practice hyperbaric and diving medicine in a way 
that is safe for both the medical staff working in the facility and the patients being treated 
there.  The tool was designed specifically to be user-friendly for use by medical doctors. 
However, achieving this objective was not simple: Hyperbaric facility risk assessment is a 
foreign concept to most medical doctors and the assessment skills required fall outside the 
scope of conventional medical education. Nevertheless, as most countries consider the 
supervising medical practitioner to be the legal user and therefore responsible for the overall 
safety of the facility, it was essential to equip doctors to meet this responsibly of which many 
were completely unaware. The risk assessment tool achieves this by providing a quantifiable 
measure of the safety status of a given hyperbaric facility.  Seen in the broader context of 
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diving medicine, this objective metric (1) engenders greater confidence for making referrals 
to such facilities; (2) affords greater confidence in the safety of the treatments facilities 
provide; (3) assures that all parties are knowledgeable about the reliability and availability of 
treatment facilities; and (4) empowers facilities to actively eliminate, mitigate or manage 
their risks. The net result is that both the doctors using and those referring to such duly 
assessed facilities would be in a better, safer and more defensible position for having assessed 
them objectively. 
Literature review  
The process of developing the “Risk Assessment Guide for Recompression Chambers” 
included an exhaustive literature survey to define current knowledge, to determine the 
knowledge gaps, to gather the relevant safety information and to compile these into one 
useable publication or guide.5 The repositories for relevant information probed during this 
review included the following: 
Maritime certification society rules  
In the main, most facilities used for diving and hyperbaric medicine have been regulated, at 
least initially, by the commercial diving industry.  A comprehensive series of guides and rules 
are routinely issued by organisations that insure the ships, vessels and platforms on which the 
diving and hyperbaric systems are installed.  These systems actually become a significant part 
of the insured vessel and, as a result, these so-called “certification societies” have had to 
develop rules to cater for the hyperbaric and diving components.  The following maritime 
certification society rules make specific provision for diving and hyperbaric systems; these 
were consulted to build the foundational knowledge base for Hyperbaric Facilities: Lloyd’s 
Rules (UK)9 , Det Norske Veritas (DNV) (Norway)10, Germanischer Lloyd (Germany)11, 
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) (USA)12, Russian Maritime Register13 and Nippon Kaiji 
Kyokai (Japan)14. The focus of all of these publications is to ensure safety for the sea-going 
vessel from fire, pressure explosion and to establish equipment redundancy requirements. 
Pressure vessel manufacture and insurance codes 
The USA has been most proactive in taking significant steps very early on to facilitate the 
insurance of pressure vessels by requiring compliance with specific code rules.  Since 1911, 
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code set has provided rules for 
pressure vessel design and pressure equipment construction.15 These rules have evolved in 
line with modern materials & engineering practices.  One particular challenge has been the 
need for introducing non-metallic components, such as windows or view ports, in pressure 
vessel design. View ports are required for lighting and visual contact with the occupants; they 
are subject to deterioration and vulnerable to damage. Often they represent the greatest 
potential weakness in the design of the pressure vessel and therefore receive significant 
attention in risk assessments. To solve the problem of non-metallic structural materials, the 
ASME established the Pressure Vessels for Human Occupancy (PVHO) standard in 1971.16 
The PVHO-1 standard then developed into a more comprehensive publication addressing 
piping systems and other PVHO requirements.16  The initial focus of these publications was 
simply to ensure structural integrity. Later PVHO-1 did expand to include certain operational 
items, such as appurtenances, safety devices and support equipment. 
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Fire protection codes  
Born out of the ashes of the Apollo 1 disaster, in which three astronauts lost their lives on the 
launch pad, the National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) was established to prevent fires 
in the USA space exploration program. Following a similar disaster in an experimental 
hyperbaric facility at Brookes Air Force Base in San Antonio, the NFPA committee 
undertook to compile a safety standard for hyperbaric facilities.17  The document has evolved 
through a series of updates and is now a well-known, leading industry standard to prevent 
fires in hyperbaric facilities. Although the primary focus is fire prevention, the document has 
inevitably taken on a certain amount of design, construction and operational content. The 
complete standard encompasses healthcare facilities in general. 
Diving industry documents 
The US Navy Diving Manual has been a repository for all their diving related equipment 
safety standards and procedures since 1956.18 In conjunction with this, the US Navy 
Technical Manual for twin-lock recompression chambers, initially drafted in 1988, provides 
the hyperbaric facilities requirements for treating injured (navy) divers.19  
Hyperbaric facilities codes and standards 
Australia’s contribution to the applicable hyperbaric codes and standards lay initially in their 
national standard AS 2299 (Occupational Diving).20 During the period 1995 – 1998, the 
Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy Facilities Industry Guidelines (HOTFIG) were developed by the 
Hyperbaric Technicians and Nurses Association (HTNA).21  These were eventually absorbed 
during the development of the formal standard known as AS 4774-2 (Work in Compressed 
Air and Hyperbaric Facilities).22 
European countries have provided a diverse and divergent series of guidelines. These have 
included the British Hyperbaric Association (BHA) code of practice23; the Italian  National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Prevention (ISPESL) guidelines24;  and then later, the 
consensus recommendations contained in the European Committee for Hyperbaric Medicine 
(ECHM) safety document.25 
In the USA, the Undersea & Hyperbaric Medical Society (UHMS) published guidelines for 
monoplace (i.e., single-occupancy) chambers in 1991.26 This was followed by multiplace 
(i.e., multiple occupancy) chamber guidelines in 1994.27 Both of these documents focused 
primarily on operational safety issues but with applicable references to the required 
equipment. 
Manufacturing and testing standards and specifications 
There are a range of general standards and specifications that provide guidance and 
requirements for materials, engineering practices, operating practices and testing regimens for 
sub-systems in hyperbaric facilities. These are published and maintained by organisations 
such as the American Society for the Testing of Materials (ASTM)28-31, the Compressed Gas 
Association (CGA)32, the International Maritime Contractors Association (IMCA)33-36, the 
European Committee for Standardisation (CEN)37, the South African Bureau of Standards 
(SABS)38-44 and NFPA45, 46. 
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South African statutes and acts associated with occupational health and safety, 
medical devices, and the practice of medicine  
Finally, the statutory publications for South Africa were consulted, including the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act47; Medicines Control Act48; and Health Act49 (later 
replaced by the National Health Act), for specific requirements pertaining to general safety 
that would apply to any hyperbaric facility. Although hyperbaric oxygen therapy represents 
the use of oxygen as a pharmaceutical agent to some extent, hyperbaric facilities are 
classified generally as medical devices in most countries. Diving regulations are generally 
inappropriate for clinical use. Medical supervision of hyperbaric oxygen therapy and 
recompression therapy provided outside of a commercial diving setting therefore typically 
falls in the category of the practice of medicine rather than diving.  
The genesis of the Risk Assessment Guide 
The Risk Assessment Guide was developed by the investigator in the mid 1990’s. The 
objective was to coalesce the myriad of regulations, statutes, codes, and guidelines into a 
single, flexible, principle-driven approach to hyperbaric facility risk and safety. It had to be 
easily accessible to the average user and be applicable to a broad range of hyperbaric 
facilities irrespective of their geographic location. To achieve this, various current risk 
management practices were consulted. Some of these, such as the Australian Standard AS 
4360, typically used refinement techniques to evaluate risk outcomes.50 The assessment 
approach is referred to as a qualitative, semi-quantitative and a quantitative analysis. The 
Australian approach to safety in the design and construction of hyperbaric equipment was 
very influential in the initial development of the Risk Assessment Guide during the late 
1990’s. However, none of the above numerous document sources provided a step-by-step list 
of how to understand, manage and operate a hyperbaric facility so as to encompass all the 
aspects that pertain to safety.  
Many scientific approaches for risk assessments exist that provide accurate, clinical and even 
quantitative assessments. There is also a plethora of standards, risk management procedures 
and guidance documents that provide and promote the use of risk scoring matrices. However, 
relevance is key when assessing hazards, and some of the greatest deficiencies in the copious 
reference materials were their disjointedness, limited contextual applicability or a complete 
lack of integration. Risk, hazard and safety are inter-related and any safety review must 
account for the potential interactions.  
To overcome these deficiencies, a method had to be found to categorise the various hazards 
as being relevant – called risk elements in this thesis – as well as being able to assess their up- 
and downstream implications intelligently. By pursuing this objective, the Risk Assessment 
Guide was ultimately able to make provision for the specific identification and assessment of 
relevant risks as well as fostering overall and ongoing maintenance of safety for a given 
facility.  
In order to develop the range of potential risk elements, the “Comparative Study of Risk 
Management Standards” provided an appraisal of a series of international and professional 
standards.51  The overriding comment from this review was that for realistic outcomes to be 
achieved, the unique hazards had to be considered that applied to the specific environment 
being evaluated. Using this central tenet, the Risk Assessment Guide focused on the primary, 
unique hazard areas associated with hyperbaric facilities for which the three categories were 
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defined as  fire-, mechanical- and health risks.8 What makes the many relevant hazards 
unique is their simultaneous presence and potentially cumulative effects within hyperbaric 
facilities.  
Although these three distinct categories of fire-, mechanical- and health risk are described in 
great detail in the Risk Assessment Guide, the actual challenge lay in determining their 
relevance by considering both the probability that a particular risk may lead to a safety breach 
as well as the potential impact of the breach. This was achieved by weighting the various 
categories and subcategories related to each, thereby allowing for relative sorting of risk 
assessment findings so that the most important ones could be identified. This is not 
proprietary information and is commonly referred to in occupational health and safety risk 
assessment ranking designs, such as those described by Donoghue52 and others53-56. For 
example, the concept of fire risk is a clear and enduring determinant of safety in hyperbaric 
environments. As such it requires a weighting in addition to more traditional technical and 
operation risk scores.  The mechanical risk category caters for hazards identified in the 
technical (structure) and ‘reliability of operation’ fields.  The health risk category allows for a 
relative weighting to accommodate human interface, interaction and exposure hazards, 
medical interventions and all other operational or management actions. 
The Risk Assessment Guide thus collates all the applicable information described above in 
order to enable a complete, comprehensive and totally applicable safety assessment on any 
type of hyperbaric facility. Importantly, unlike the common practice of blind compliance by 
means of a checklist provided by a specific standard or specification, the Risk Assessment 
Guide assesses the actual risks that apply to a specific facility. This unique approach is able 
to account for all aspects of system design and function of a given facility from the 
perspective of global safety integration, not merely an itemised review. 
Applying the Risk Assessment Guide 
Commencing in 1998, the Risk Assessment Guide was applied over a period of 13 years to a 
total of 105 facilities from around the globe.  The scope of the assessments covered a wide 
range of facilities – from those located within developed countries with defined regulatory 
requirements to facilities located in remote regions where no national, regional or local 
regulations existed.  Requests for assessment were motivated by different reasons. Remote 
and unregulated areas requested assessments in order to provide the medical doctors using 
these facilities with safety assurances and the necessary confidence that patients and staff 
would not be at unnecessary risk with the doctors bearing the legal burden for any 
complications. Those in developed areas sometimes needed to reassure hospital boards, 
medical protection organizations and even funders. As such, the scope of the assessed 
facilities was not only diverse, but it actually included the majority of global facilities eligible 
for assessment.    
Comprehensive reports, which detailed all the safety risks and other concerns, were submitted 
following the assessment. For a number of facilities, second and even third reports were 
submitted (after re-assessment).   All the reports contained a section with details on all non-
compliances with the Risk Assessment Guide, as well as a list of recommendations for 
improvement of safety (where safety issues arose but that did not pose an immediate risk 
during on-going operations).  These reports provided a helpful reference document to guide 
the facility on ongoing quality assurance and safety improvements; it drew attention to the 
areas of concern, and provided practical recommendations to address them. 
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Upon initiating these assessments, it soon became evident that there were a number of 
common areas of non-compliance affecting the safety status of the facilities. This information 
is entirely unique as there has never been a systematic review of hyperbaric facilities prior to 
this work. The UHMS only started its accreditation process for hospital-based facilities in the 
USA in 2001; to date, the UHMS has not reported on any of its collective findings. 
Therefore, the information contained in this thesis represents an invaluable resource: On the 
one hand it contains information from a sample of facilities that covers a cross-section of the 
total number of international hyperbaric facilities; and on the other it is made up of two thirds 
of the eligible hyperbaric facilities used in the treatment of injured divers (see study inclusion 
criteria). Until now, none of this information has been in the public domain. In fact, the 
literature review identified virtually a complete absence of data on risk assessment outcomes; 
associated or influencing factors; and primary safety factors influencing decisions by, or 
technical knowledge required for, medical practitioners at hyperbaric facilities.  Without this 
information, neither medical practitioners nor emergency referral organisations are able to 
make informed decisions on patient referrals, nor to appreciate the liability for doing so. Both 
the original production of the Risk Assessment Guide as well as its application over 13 years 
were motivated by this – to empower medical practitioners and staff to assess and address 
risks and to fill the knowledge and competence gap to achieve this.  
Upon completion, this thesis should provide those who are required to refer diving casualties 
to a hyperbaric facility with the necessary information and assurance of the essential safety 
status of the facility to guide appropriate decisions. Conversely, for those who serve injured 
divers at these facilities, this work will provide a tool for improving and maintaining the 
safety status of their facility in order to respond to these referrals in an appropriate and 
confident way. 
Study aim and objectives 
The main aim of this study was to review the data generated during the application of the 
Risk Assessment Guide in order to:  
 retrospectively review the most common safety concerns affecting facility status as 
identified by the Risk Assessment Guide so as to: 
o determine a risk score for each risk element and to rank them by importance; 
o determine a risk assessment score for each facility, based on the risks 
associated with all the findings at the facility so as to rank facilities’ risk 
standings relative to other facilities; and 
o identify the leading factors determining the risk scores and risk assessment 
scores. 
 to consolidate the results derived from the analyses to produce specific 
recommendations to improve and maintain safety status. 
In the course of the review, it became evident that a number of associated factors varied 
significantly between facilities.  This resulted in the following objective being added 
retrospectively: 
 to use the data derived from the analysis to produce a predictive model that allows the 
risk profile of a facility to be predicted based on knowing the associated factors.  
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Chapter 2: Study methodology 
Study design 
The aim and objectives of this study were realized by performing a retrospective review of 
the risk assessment reports of recompression facilities that had been assessed over the 
previous 13 years (1998 to 2011). 
Study setting 
There are approximately 750 international hyperbaric facilities that are potentially available 
for diver recompression treatment. This estimate is based on a physical review of the 
hyperbaric facilities listed by the Divers Alert Network of America and the Divers Alert 
Network of Europe, as captured in their “Medical Services Call Centre Database”. The list 
contains facilities that have either participated previously in treating divers referred to them 
by Divers Alert Network or those who have registered themselves specifically for this 
purpose. However, only a minority of these facilities were appropriate for assessment using 
the Risk Assessment Guide: Most of these facilities are primarily established for clinical 
hyperbaric oxygen therapy for non-diving related conditions; diver treatments are secondary 
and usually incidental to their other activities. Other facilities fall within jurisdictions where 
strict accreditation or other regulatory controls are well-established, thereby negating the 
need to perform further assessments. Some hyperbaric facilities belong to naval or other 
military facilities that do not sanction civilian assessments or interference with their strictly 
military protocols – even though such chambers might accept an injured civilian diver in an 
extreme emergency.  
By eliminating the clinical hyperbaric oxygen facilities, those strictly accredited and the 
military facilities, a total of 160 international hyperbaric facilities remained where the 
treatment of injured recreational divers was their primary scope of services.  These facilities 
were also those that would be eligible for assessment under a global chamber safety 
improvement program. Out of these 160 potential hyperbaric facilities, a total of 105 were 
inspected, assessed and reported on by the investigator between 1998 to 2011 – a period of 13 
years.  These facilities were located in areas at or near diving regions around the globe, 
stretching east as far as Papua New Guinea; west as far as the Galapagos Islands; north as far 
as Ireland; and south as far as South Africa. 
The data, in the form of 105 initial, comprehensive risk assessment reports, personal notes, 
documentation and photographs, had been collected through personal on-site visits. These 
included visual inspection of all the facilities, a review of all applicable documentation and 
interviewing of the facility personnel. 
In several cases, based on utilisation as well as requests by facility owners or medical 
directors, follow-up visits were undertaken and revised reports were issued. These were not 
included in the analysis. 
The majority of the facilities were used by medical practitioners who primarily provided 
hyperbaric treatments to injured recreational divers.  The same facilities were also used as 
referral centres by, amongst others, diving safety organizations like the Divers Alert 
Network. 
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Study “participants” 
The “participants” for this study were the 105 assessed hyperbaric facilities as represented by 
their respective risk assessment reports. 
Inclusion criteria 
All the hyperbaric facilities that were assessed by the investigator were included in the 
analysis.  Only the initial assessment reports were used in the analysis of data. Subsequent or 
follow-up visits included improvements undertaken as a result of the initial risk assessment 
performed and were therefore excluded.  Initial assessments thus preserved the actual status 
prior to any education, guidance or instruction provided.  The original assessment notes, 
photographs taken of the facility and photocopies of equipment certification documentation 
were used where any data was unclear or where clarification of the condition of the facility 
was required. 
Exclusion criteria 
The only exclusion condition was that no follow-up risk assessment reports were utilised in 
the data capturing or analysis.  Therefore the analysis did not account for facilities closing, 
changes in management, ownership, types or numbers of recompression chambers in use, 
scope of services, or staffing, whether facilities were deemed safe for use or not, or any other 
qualitative or quantitative findings raised during assessments. 
Data sources 
All data was extracted from the original risk assessment reports compiled on completion of 
the on-site evaluations, together with accompanying photographs taken to record the actual 
equipment, and any notes used to record safety concerns. 
Variables 
The actual non-compliant (NC)† issues, as classified in the Risk Assessment Guide and listed 
in table 1, were the primary data collated and analysed.5, 8  These had been identified during 
the visits to facilities and are described at the back of each facility’s risk assessment report.   
These NC’s were categorized and captured by the investigator.  For each facility assessed, the 
absolute number of NC’s identified at the facility was captured.  These were then used to 
calculate a risk assessment score for each facility. 
The following variables were also collected from the risk assessment reports, notes, facility 
documentation and photographs. These variables represented relatively objective information 
about the facility and its operations.  They were assessed as potential predictors for risk 
assessment scores to be employed subsequently in the development of a predictive model: 
 The geographic location worldwide (country or region);  
                                                            
† A non-compliant (NC) issue arises where a hazard is identified as being a potential risk at a facility and is not 
suitably addressed, mitigated or contained. A NC is also referred to as a “Risk Element” or an element of 
concern in the context of this study. 
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 The year that the facility was assessed for the first time; 
 The operating age or time that the facility had been in operation (in years) as at the 
date of the initial assessment, classified as less than one year, between one and five 
years and more than five years; 
 The type of treatment protocols provided, recorded by reference to internationally-
accepted treatment tables (USN TT5, TT6, TT6A, Comex 30), which provide 
information on treatment pressures and therapeutic gases utilised;57, 58 
 The type of chamber installed, categorized as monoplace (single lock) or multiplace 
(multi lock chambers); 
 A referral rating, categorized from A to F, which is based on type of service and 
whether the facility is suitable for referral. Together with the type of treatment 
protocols available, this will aid categorisation of facilities for medical referral 
purposes. 
A: Hospital-based facilities, with in-chamber advanced life support capabilities. 
B:  Hospital-based facilities with no in-chamber advanced life support capabilities. 
C:  Non-hospital based facilities allowing treatments at absolute pressures 
exceeding 300kPa. 
D:  Non-hospital based facilities allowing oxygen treatments only. 
E:  Facilities where a restriction applied due to safety concerns and referral to such 
facilities were not recommended at the time of assessment. 
F:  Facilities that were not considered safe at the time of the assessment where no 
treatments should be provided.  
 Availability of services for diving emergencies, categorized as either during office 
hours only or with after-hours support or on a 24/7 basis. (Some facilities were closed 
at the time of the assessment, either due to management changes, not yet being 
operationally ready to accept patients, or closed due to technical issues.); 
 The utilisation of the facility divided into three categories, namely low (less than five 
patients per year), normal (between five and fifty patients per year) and high (more 
than fifty patients per year); 
 The system reliability, dichotomised as yes or no, based on the evidenced 
maintenance regimen. A well-structured and effective maintenance program was 
considered as sufficient to ensure a reliable facility.  
 Sustainability of the facility, dichotomised as yes or no, based on a combination of 
funding-stream (stable income from insurance companies or paying patients), stability 
of ownership (lack of frequent changes in ownership or management) and the 
permanence of staff (low staff turn-over profile).  
 The degree of medical supervision, based on the presence of an appropriately trained 
doctor, categorized as either on a full time, on-call or completely absent basis; 
 The staff skillset, categorized as being formally certified to local/international 
standards (formal), trained in-house (informal), or with no acknowledged training (not 
trained). 
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Processing of data  
In order to calculate the frequency of NC’s across the spectrum of facilities assessed, all NC’s 
were reported on using a simple 1 = yes or blank = no notation.  For greater consistency, 
only absolute values were applied; no degree of mitigation was captured.  For example, in 
situations where the lack of a specific item could be mitigated by a specific operational 
procedure or by addressing the risk on a temporary or permanent basis, this fact was 
disregarded in determining the risk scores. Similarly, to minimise the Hawthorne-effect, even 
simple remedial actions that were proposed and implemented by the staff during the course of 
the assessment (e.g.,  applying physical work-arounds, procedural changes, awareness 
education and even removal of equipment, materials or practices), were disregarded for 
greater consistency in determining the baseline risk score. Only the raw data were used to 
determine the relative spread across the spectrum of participants.  The number of facilities 
that presented with a specific NC was divided by the total number of facilities evaluated, thus 
providing a percentage of facilities that did not comply with a specific item. 
The objective of the study was to make a semi-quantitative assessment of risk for the purpose 
of comparison design.50  Thus, in order to rank the NC’s across the participant spectrum, the 
risk score was used rather than frequency of occurrence. In this way the relevance of a 
particular NC to the overall safety could be determined systematically by applying an 
appropriate weighting system. In other words, by multiplying the frequency of occurrence 
with the likelihood of occurrence of a safety breach given a particular NC with the severity or 
consequence of such an event, the potential impact of the NC on overall safety could be 
consolidated into a single risk score.   
In order to determine the likelihood of occurrence of a safety breach, given a particular NC, a 
5-point Likert scale was used for each of the three main hazard groups (i.e., fire-, mechanical- 
and health risk).  This probability weighting provided a relative measure that could be applied 
consistently to all participants. In the same way a second 5-point Likert scale was used to 
provide a relative indication of the potential severity of occurrence of a safety breach 
resulting from exposure to a particular hazard.   
Some references, such as the US Department of the Interior, employ a categorical Risk 
Assessment Code designation by means of an alphabetical letter.56 However, this was not 
suitable for the purpose of comparative analysis, nor would it have permitted the formulation 
of a predictive model. Thus, even though the weighting was a relative measure, based on 
expert opinion, the ultimate RS is understood to be a relative value – permitting comparisons 
between risk elements – rather than being an absolute one. As such, a numerical value output 
has greater utility for the purpose of comparisons and to allow numerical sorting. Thus, even 
though risk scores are inevitably somewhat subjective in nature, the investigator provided 
consistency by (1) assuming in each case that the severity represented the likely worst case in 
every event, and (2) by avoiding any amelioration or mitigation in determining severity when 
applying this score to any of the NC’s.    
Appendix A displays the basic scoring system that was adopted and utilized during 
processing of the raw data.   
The risk elements (i.e., the relevant hazards) were also subdivided into three subsections, viz. 
technical (mechanical & electrical), managerial (administrative), and maintenance hazards. 
The technical hazards represented engineering areas of risk; managerial represented the 
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operational risk of the facility; and maintenance covered the risks associated with any lack of 
continuous attention to equipment and facilities.  
These subsections were added to differentiate between purely technical issues and those 
introduced by the human interface. In general, Hyperbaric Facilities that are designed, built, 
installed and commissioned according to the various mandated standards 22, 59, 60 and 
guidance documents 26, 27, 61, are unlikely to be rendered unsafe through purely technical 
means. 
Study size and sample size calculation 
The full list of available risk assessment reports for the facilities was reviewed for inclusion.  
As only the facilities that offered recompression treatment of injured divers as their primary 
service had requested risk assessment, no facilities were excluded from the sample. 
Quantitative variables 
The mean number of NC’s (with standard deviations) and the median number of NC’s (with 
interquartile ranges) are used to describe the sample statistics.  Population values are 
estimated by means of 95% confidence intervals.  
For each country in which facilities were assessed, the mean number of NC’s for all facilities 
in that country, as well as the mean and median RAS are presented.‡ 
Statistical methods 
Each NC item is described in terms of the absolute number and as a percentage of facilities 
found to be non-compliant to that item.  Population estimates for these values are indicated 
by means of 95% confidence intervals.   
Likewise, for each NC item a risk score§ was calculated by multiplying the frequency of 
occurrence with the weighting system as described in the section (“processing of data”) 
above.  The population risk scores associated with each item are again indicated by means of 
95% confidence intervals. 
The Risk Assessment Score (RAS) was then determined for each facility: The weighted 
scores for each of the NC’s at a specific facility were collated and summed into a total RAS 
for each individual facility and the population data again shown as 95% confidence intervals. 
In order to evaluate the association of individual factors (e.g., demographic factors such as 
region; treatment pressure; presence of a medical practitioner; etc.) with the RAS across the 
sample, the mean RAS’s were compared between the different subgroups representing  each 
of these factors.  To avoid circular reasoning, the individual factors associated with RAS 
scores were not part of the risk assessment scoring system; they were descriptive factors 
                                                            
‡  In most countries only a single facility was assessed.  It is therefore not considered appropriate to estimate 
population values (e.g. 95% confidence intervals) for the different countries, i.e. it is not considered appropriate 
to extrapolate population values from a single data point.  
§ For the sake of clarity, it is worth stating again that: a risk score (RS) is the sum of all weighted NC’s per risk 
element or concern; a RAS is the sum of all weighted NC’s per facility. 
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related to the nature, staffing, and practice patterns of the facility. When only two sub-groups 
existed within each variable, the F-test was used for comparison of variances and the t-test 
was used to compare the mean RAS’s (assuming equal or unequal variances as determined by 
the F-test).  However, if one of the sub-groups contained less than 30 observations, the 
Wilcoxon rank sum test was used.  When more than two sub-groups were compared, the 
Analysis of Variance for independent samples was used to compare the mean RAS’s (or the 
Kruskal-Wallis test when individual sub-groups contained less than 30 observations).  A p-
value <0.05 was considered statistically significant.  All these analyses were performed using 
the PhStat2 add-in system (version 2.5.0) for Microsoft® Excel®. 
After describing and analysing the association of individual factors (variables) with the RAS, 
a multiple linear regression analysis was used to derive a linear equation to predict RAS, 
based on using the associated factors as predictors.  
The final predictive model was built using manual intelligent modelling and likelihood ratio 
tests.  Factors were introduced into the model one at a time starting with the variable 
considered to be the most important from a practical clinical point of view.  Factors were 
removed from the model if they did not contribute to an increased R-squared and the 
likelihood ratio test was insignificant. This way the minimum number of significant 
determining factors could be selected. The final model was tested by once again adding the 
excluded variables one at a time and testing their significance, using likelihood ratio tests.  
This analysis was performed using Stata (StataCorp) version 12.1. A p-value <0.05 was 
considered as statistically significant. 
Ethical considerations 
This study was approved by the Health Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of Stellenbosch 
University (reference number: N11/08/263).  The following ethical considerations were kept 
in mind throughout the conducting of this study: 
Beneficiation – the study participants (implying the individual facilities that were assessed 
and reported on) did not benefit directly from participation in this study although they had 
benefited greatly from the original assessments and reports from which the data was derived.  
In addition, there are significant benefits to the hyperbaric industry as a whole as a result of 
this study: Identification of common risks can prioritise the development of detailed guidance 
documents leading to safer treatment facilities worldwide.  Also, the identification of factors 
commonly associated with high risk facilities will indicate the areas of highest priority to 
make individual facilities safer. 
Non-maleficence – no harm or detriment is expected to arise through the performance and 
publication of this study. The results of the initial assessments were shared only between the 
hyperbaric chamber facilities and the diving safety organisation who jointly requested the 
assessment.  This study is retrospective in nature and did not identify any facilities by name. 
Confidentiality –the names of the facilities used during the initial and follow-up assessments 
are not disclosed in the study.  Traceability was achieved using a simple number reference to 
a password-protected spread-sheet, to which only the investigator had access.  Only the 
general geographic location is indicated in the data collection form and reported as such. 
Non-discrimination – there is no discrimination against any facility, staff members or 
industries served.  In most cases, facilities were either owned by international organisations, 
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by local diving industries, or by local medical establishments.  Staffing is usually a 
combination of local and international (ex-pat) members.  Regional locations do not 
determine the nationality of the owners or operators.  Divers travel internationally from 
Europe, the United States and practically all countries across the globe. There is no recording 
of ethnicity, culture, religion, financial means, community standing or individual abilities.  
Since none of these factors have ever been identified as having a direct bearing on the safety 
of a facility, these were not captured. 
Informed consent – the initial and follow-up assessments were all done at the specific request 
(and thus with the implicit consent) of the facility being assessed.  The assessment reports 
have also been shared only with the specific facility and the diving safety organization 
involved; not with any third party.  Obtaining informed consent for this analysis from 
individual facilities that were assessed over a period of 13 years proved to be completely 
impractical: several facilities had since closed, others had changed hands, and a number of 
them had been rebuilt or re-structured. In many cases, the original staff members have left 
including the persons who had requested the original assessment. The investigator also 
ensured that no personal, business, operational or financial information of any facility was 
exposed in this study. As a result, the HREC approved a waiver of informed consent to 
conduct this study.    
Budget and funding resources 
The original development of the Risk Assessment Guide by the investigator was self-funded 
with modest sponsorships from a South African hyperbaric management company and an 
international diving safety organization. The 105 on-site assessments and reports, on which 
this study was based, were also performed by the investigator. These assessments, undertaken 
over a period of 13 years, were funded by the individual facilities and the international diving 
safety organization. This study required the personal time and resources of the investigator 
only.  Resources such as computer-time, printing, internet access, literature resources and 
telephone access were borne by the investigator.  These were minimal, as was expected. 
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Chapter 3: Results 
General  
Out of a total population of 160 hyperbaric facilities, 105 (66%) were assessed and therefore 
eligible for inclusion in this study.  The assessments covered a total of 42 countries that are 
listed in Table 3 (in alphabetical order).  No eligible facilities were excluded from the 
analysis.  
No data gaps appeared during the extraction process that could not be interpreted or retrieved 
from photographs, assessor notes or facility manuals.  The variables for all participants could 
be collated with the highest degree of accuracy. 
The results are reported with the risk scores (in terms of the individual hazards identified at 
the facilities) and then as risk assessment scores applicable to the remaining variables. 
Risk assessment scores of individual risk element 
The Risk Assessment Scores (RAS’s) from the study are presented in the following tables 
using the variables and the weighted results detailed in the study methodology. Table 1 
contains the relevant hazards (risk elements), with the total number of non-compliances 
(NC’s) to the Risk Assessment Guide (RAG) across the total number of facilities (n=105), the 
frequency of occurrence as percentages of the total number of facilities, and the risk score 
(RS). 
The relevant hazards are listed in order of magnitude of RS: from the highest score – the 
highest safety concern – through to the lowest score. 
Table 1: Hazards (risk elements) determined by means of non-compliance to the RAG 
 NC’s RS 
Relevant hazard description (risk element) N ƒ (%) 95% CI Value 95% CI 
Safety drills not practiced 89 85 78 - 92 33 30 - 36 
Alternative breathing gas for operator - not provided for 91 87 80 - 93 32 30 - 34 
Emergency operating/medical procedures un-documented 82 78 70 - 86 31 27 - 34 
Maintenance system absent, inadequate or inappropriate 69 66 57 - 75 28 24 - 32 
Leak testing not done  74 70 62 - 79 27 24 - 31 
Air supply analysis or quality control lacking 85 81 73 - 88 27 24 - 29 
Particle filters before regulators absent 85 81 73 - 88 27 24 - 29 
Standard operating procedures not documented 68 65 56 - 74 25 22 - 29 
Line isolation monitoring not installed  98 93 89 - 98 25 24 - 26 
Oxygen cleaning procedures not in place 100 95 91 - 99 25 24 - 26 
Operator check lists inadequate or lacking 65 62 53 - 71 24 21 - 28 
Fire suppression system for chamber- testing inadequate  84 80 72 - 88 22 20 - 25 
Dual shell valves or shell valves lacking  73 70 61 - 78 22 19 - 24 
Safety valve checks & testing obsolete 73 70 61 - 78 22 19 - 24 
Facility manual with policies inadequate or lacking 101 96 93 - 100 21 20 - 22 
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 NC’s RS 
Relevant hazard description (risk element) N ƒ (%) 95% CI Value 95% CI 
Management audits & control lacking 101 96 93 - 100 21 20 - 22 
Training & certification inadequate or inappropriate 46 44 34 - 53 21 16 - 25 
Ground fault or earth leakage system not installed 69 66 57 - 75 20 18 - 23 
Written appointments lacking 86 82 75 - 89 20 18 - 21 
Emergency chamber lighting lacking 71 68 59 - 77 19 16 - 21 
Wiring inappropriate or messy 54 51 42 - 61 19 15 - 22 
Oxygen analyser calibration missing 74 70 62 - 79 18 15 - 20 
Power supply to chamber not ungrounded 68 65 56 - 74 17 15 - 20 
Flexible hose maintenance neglected 53 50 41 - 60 17 14 - 20 
Alternative breathing gas (occupants) not provided for 64 61 52 - 70 16 14 - 19 
Back-up communicator absent 48 46 36 - 55 16 12 - 19 
PTFE1 tape inappropriate  95 90 85 - 96 15 14 - 16 
Anti-suction devices missing or not installed 51 49 39 - 58 15 12 - 18 
Safety valve for treatment depth not installed 91 87 80 - 93 15 14 - 16 
Chamber escape not possible 89 85 78 - 92 14 13 - 16 
Particle filters need to be cleaned  87 83 76 - 90 14 13 - 15 
Viewport safety concerns (certification, age or type) 52 50 40 - 59 14 11 - 17 
Gas cylinder security compromised  30 29 20 - 37 13 9 - 17 
Fire alarm not provided for 80 76 68 - 84 13 12 - 14 
High pressure gas safety valve absent on regulator  40 38 29 - 47 13 10 - 16 
Labelling of chamber components inadequate  40 38 29 - 47 13 10 - 16 
Air supply redundancy inadequate (insufficient gas) 52 50 40 - 59 13 10 - 15 
Back-up power missing or inadequate 42 40 31 - 49 13 10 - 16 
Chamber grounding not in place 50 48 38 - 57 12 10 - 15 
Oxygen supply quality control inadequate 58 55 46 - 65 12 10 - 14 
Caisson gauge lacking 48 46 36 - 55 11 9 - 14 
Contamination of oxygen BIBS2 (air not O2 compatible) 40 38 29 - 47 11 9 - 14 
Fire suppression system (chamber) – no water filter  42 40 31 - 49 11 9 - 14 
Gas supply check valves not installed 34 32 23 - 41 11 8 - 14 
Lubricants used on equipment inappropriate 34 32 23 - 41 11 8 - 14 
Closed-circuit television missing 37 35 26 - 44 10 7 - 12 
Safety valve on chamber lacking or incorrectly set 22 21 13 - 29 9 5 - 12 
Room fire detection, signage and fire doors lacking  52 50 40 - 59 8 7 - 10 
Compromised air intake (risk of contamination) 25 24 16 - 32 8 5 - 11 
Oxygen & electricity exposed in panel (fire hazard) 40 38 29 - 47 8 6 - 9 
Discrete communicator absent  57 54 45 - 64 8 6 - 9 
Oxygen isolation valve absent (zone valve) 57 54 45 - 64 8 6 - 9 
Pressure vessel testing after installation not done 30 29 20 - 37 7 5 - 10 
Gauge calibration outdated or lacking 70 67 58 - 76 7 6 - 8 
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 NC’s RS 
Relevant hazard description (risk element) N ƒ (%) 95% CI Value 95% CI 
Workshop/area inadequate 28 27 18 - 35 7 5 - 9 
Oxygen sample points inadequate  24 23 15 - 31 6 4 - 9 
Service lock interlock absent  24 23 15 - 31 6 4 - 9 
Patient indemnity form lacking  47 45 35 - 54 6 5 - 8 
Bilge cleaning lacking (dirt & health hazard) 16 15 8 - 22 6 3 - 9 
Exhaust gas outlets not secure  39 37 28 - 46 6 4 - 7 
Piping materials unsuitable 12 11 5 - 18 5 2 - 7 
Safety valve flow capacity inadequate  11 10 5 - 16 4 2 - 7 
Pressure vessel certification lacking or inappropriate 17 16 9 - 23 4 2 - 6 
Room fire extinguishers lacking 26 25 17 - 33 4 3 - 6 
Oxygen analyser alarm needed (no high level alarm) 19 18 11 - 25 4 2 - 5 
Connectors inappropriate for application  11 10 5 - 16 3 1 - 5 
Oxygen analyser not installed  12 11 5 - 18 3 1 - 5 
Clothing control not suitable  18 17 10 - 24 3 2 - 4 
Fire suppression system for chamber - absent or lacking  19 18 11 - 25 3 2 - 4 
Exhaust gas dumped  into the chamber room  12 11 5 - 18 3 2 - 4 
Switches installed not appropriate 10 10 4 - 15 3 1 - 5 
Bilge inspection lacking (corrosion or damage) 9 9 3 - 14 3 1 - 4 
Back pressure regulators lacking  11 10 5 - 16 3 1 - 4 
Hearing/noise protection needed  18 17 10 - 24 2 1 - 3 
Glycerine filled pressure gauges used  7 7 2 - 11 2 1 - 4 
Chamber flooring inappropriate (fire or slip hazard) 8 8 3 - 13 2 1 - 4 
Oxygen supply & back-up volumes inadequate (for Tx)  11 10 5 - 16 2 1 - 3 
Air conditioning in room or chamber inadequate/absent  12 11 5 - 18 2 1 - 3 
Oxygen storage in room inappropriate  8 8 3 - 13 1 0 - 2 
Fire escape from room restricted  7 7 2 - 11 1 0 - 2 
Electric motors in chamber not appropriate 2 2 0 - 5 1 0 - 1 
Floor cleaning compound inappropriate 1 1 0 - 3 0 0 - 0 
Mean values: 47 45% 39 - 51 12 10 - 14 
Standard deviation: 29 28%  9 
 
Median value: 47 44% 11 
IQR (Q3 – Q1) 52 49% 14 
1 PTFE: polytetrafluoroethylene, referred to as Teflon® or PTFE tape. Oxygen applications require this product to be 
degreased and compatible for use with oxygen, in order to minimise the risk of fire. 
2 BIBS: Built-in-breathing-system, referring to the equipment used to provide therapeutic gas to the chamber occupant and, 
usually, to expel exhaled gas outside of the chamber. 
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Table 2 indicates the relevant RS values for each of the three risk element subdivisions -- 
Technical, Management and Maintenance. The values for all relevant hazards are also 
reflected, consistent with Table 1 above. 
Included are the mean RS values for all the relevant hazards (risk elements) per subdivision, 
together with standard deviations, as well as the computed median values and interquartile 
ranges.  
Table 2: Risk Score (RS) values for the three main risk element subdivisions 
 Hazards 
(n) 
Mean RS 
(SD) 
Median RS 
(IQR) 95% CI 
Technical hazards  
(mechanical & electrical) 
62 10 (7) 9 (10) 8 - 12 
Management & 
administrative hazards 10 16 (10) 21 (5) 9 - 23 
Maintenance hazards 10 17 (9) 18 (16) 10 - 23 
ALL HAZARDS 82 12 (9) 11 (14) 10 - 14 
Figure 1 below illustrates the nature of the distribution of the RS values around the mean 
value of 12 (SD ±9).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: Normal probability distribution of risk scores for all risk elements 
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Associated factors 
The descriptive variables that were used in the RAS association analysis, extracted from the 
assessment reports, are summarised below.  Table 5 below contains a summary of all the data 
used to describe the variables. 
Region: 
Table 3 below provides the computed values for NC and RAS values for each country 
containing one or more facilities.  For the purpose of comparing facilities by region, the NC 
values listed are mean values for all facilities within that country. Similarly, the RAS values 
include both mean and median values for the facilities in the specific country.  
Table 3: List of countries where facilities were assessed 
Country* No. facilities NCMean RASMean RASMedian 
Bahamas 2 44 702 702 
Belize 1 27 506 506 
Bermuda 1 25 436 436 
Bosnia 1 54 849 849 
Brazil 5 44 713 742 
Canary Islands 4 46 775 761 
Cayman Islands 2 25 436 436 
Colombia 1 58 866 866 
Costa Rica 3 24 859 859 
Croatia 4 24 414 441 
Cyprus 4 34 599 668 
Dominican Republic 3 49 804 811 
Egypt 9 44 750 764 
Ecuador (Galapagos) 1 41 735 735 
France (Reunion) 1 24 435 435 
Germany 1 48 787 787 
Honduras 2 39 654 654 
Hungary 1 17 318 318 
Ireland 2 34 471 471 
Israel 1 34 579 579 
Italy 1 25 366 366 
Jamaica 2 51 822 822 
Madeira 1 27 504 504 
Maldives 7 37 630 644 
Mauritius 1 32 610 610 
Mexico 5 45 717 748 
N. Antilles 5 40 685 736 
Namibia 1 9 185 185 
Panama 1 25 440 440 
Papua New Guinea 1 35 597 597 
Poland 1 14 216 216 
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Country* No. facilities NCMean RASMean RASMedian 
Portugal & Azores 3 30 534 492 
Serbia 3 38 640 559 
Seychelles 2 39 679 679 
South Africa 7 20 356 277 
Switzerland 2 39 672 672 
Tanzania (Zanzibar) 1 19 309 309 
Thailand 2 31 543 543 
Turkey 3 46 760 730 
Turks & Caicos 1 28 503 503 
UK Channel Islands 1 21 392 392 
USA & USVI 2 40 698 698 
West Indies 2 49 783 783 
Total 105 3855 - - 
Mean (total)† - 37 619 - 
Standard deviation - 12 188 - 
Median (total)† - 38 - 680 
IQR (Q3 – Q1) - 18 - 259 
*The term “Country” is sometimes used loosely to include self-determining island regions. 
† These two computed values provide average and median values for the entire data set, for all 105 facilities.  The 
tabulated RAS mean and median values are determined per country.
The global RAS for all facilities yielded a mean value of 619 (95%CI = 583 – 656). 
Year assessed: 
To obtain a meaningful analysis of mean RAS scores by year, those years with single 
assessments and those with no assessments were excluded from the analysis. Only one 
facility was assessed in 1998 and in 2000, yielding RAS’s of 203 and 185 respectively.  No 
facility was assessed in 1999.  The remainder of the data are contained in Table 4. There is no 
statistically significant difference in the mean RAS of facilities when considering the year 
(2001 through 2011) of assessment (p=0.083).  
Table 4: Number of facilities assessed each year (2001 – 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year of assessment No.  facilities assessed 
2001 2 
2002 9 
2003 7 
2004 9 
2005 12 
2006 12 
2007 13 
2008 18 
2009 11 
2010 4 
2011 6 
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Figure 2 below depicts the RAS for facilities assessed by year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operating age: 
Based on population trends, the number of years that the facility had been in operation as at 
the date of the initial assessment was indicated in three classes: < 1 year, between 1 and 5 
years, and > 5 years.  There seemed to be a positive association between the average RAS 
and the duration of the facilities’ operations.  However the average RAS in these three classes 
did not differ significantly (p=0.117). 
Figure 3 displays the relationship between the RAS and the facilities’ operating age: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average risk assessment scores (with 95% confidence intervals) by 
year of assessment (2001 - 2011)
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Figure 2: The average RAS of facilities assessed each year 
Figure 3: The average RAS by operating age
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Type of treatment protocols: 
Treatment protocols have pressure and time dimensions. The pressure component carries 
greater significance in terms of risk as the complexity of treatment and the potential range of 
complications increase proportionally. Therefore, treatments were classed according to 
maximum pressure (depth) and three pressure regimes were recorded: up to 300 kPa, up to 
400 kPa and up to 600 kPa (all indicated as absolute pressures). There is a trend indicating an 
increased average RAS with an increase in maximum treatment pressure offered by the 
facility.  The 95% confidence intervals for the average RAS in these groups overlap. 
However, the p-value (using non-parametric methods as is appropriate) is significant at 
0.020. 
Figure 4 depicts the relationship between the RAS and the maximum pressure of the 
treatment tables provided by a facility.   
Type of chamber: 
There is a statistically significant difference between the RAS for monoplace (i.e., single lock 
/ occupancy) and multiplace (i.e., multi lock / occupancy) chambers (p=0.005).  Monoplace 
facilities are typically simpler to operate. The average RAS for multiplace chambers is 641 
(95%CI = 607 to 675), higher than that for monoplace chambers, where the average RAS is 
414 (95%CI = 234 to 595). 
Referral rating: 
The referral rating was assigned in 6 referral categories, A through F.  The average RAS is 
significantly different between the referral categories (p<0.001), with a trend indicating in-
hospital facilities having a lower average RAS than stand-alone facilities. 
Figure 5 depicts the relationship between the RAS and the referral category assigned to a 
facility.  
Figure 4: The average RAS by maximum treatment depth of the facility
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Availability: 
Availability of the facilities to manage recreational diving injuries was categorized as either 
open during office hours (with after-hours support) or open on a 24/7 basis. As mentioned in 
the methods section above, some facilities were not operational (closed) at the time of the 
assessment and were excluded from this analysis (n=10).  The trend indicates increased safety 
(a lower RAS) with facilities that are more readily available for treatments and this trend is 
statistically significant (p<0.001). 
Figure 6 depicts the relationship between the RAS and the availability of the chamber 
facilities. 
Figure 5: The average RAS by referral category
Figure 6: The average RAS in relation to the availability of the facilities 
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Utilization:  
Utilisation of the facility was divided into three categories, namely low (less than five 
patients per year), normal (between five and fifty patients per year) and high (more than fifty 
patients per year).  Again, a statistically significant trend indicating a lower average RAS 
with an increase in case load was found (p<0.001). 
Figure 7 depicts the relationship between the RAS and the case-load of the facilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reliability: 
The system reliability was rendered either as reliable or as un-reliable.  The RAS was higher 
for facilities classified as “unreliable” (average RAS = 790; 95%CI = 719 to 861) than those 
classified as “reliable” (average RAS = 597; 95%CI = 559 to 635), yielding a statistically 
significant difference (p<0.001). 
Sustainability: 
Sustainability of the facility was dichotomised as yes or no, based on a combination of factors 
outlined in the methods section. All facilities were classified as sustainable or unsustainable.  
Facilities classified as sustainable had an average RAS of 589 (95%CI = 549 to 629), which 
was significantly lower (p<0.001) than the average RAS of facilities that were classified as 
unsustainable (average RAS = 766 95%CI = 713 to 820). 
Medical supervision: 
Medical supervision was indicated as having a full-time doctor, an on-call doctor, or no 
doctor at all.  A lower RAS is associated with increased medical supervision.  The 95% 
confidence intervals overlap, but is probably due to a lack of power, since very few (n=5) 
facilities had no medical supervision.  A non-parametric analysis (Kruskal-Wallis) yielded a 
p-value of 0.013. 
Figure 7: The relationship between the average RAS and the case-load of the facility 
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Figure 8 provides a graphical depiction of the relationship between the RAS and the level of 
medical supervision provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Staff training: 
The staff skillset was categorized by the type of training they had received – formal, informal 
or no training.   
The relationship between the RAS and the training provided to staff members in the facility is 
depicted in figure 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: The relationship between the average RAS and staff training
Figure 8: The relationship between the average RAS and medical supervision 
provided 
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A highly significant trend is present, indicating a lower RAS in staff receiving formal 
training, compared to informal or no training (p<0.001). 
The average RAS with formal (i.e., accredited training) training is 404, with the 95%CI = 326 
to 482.  The average RAS for informal (in-house or on-the-job) training is 676, with the 
95%CI = 646 to 706, while the average RAS associated with a lack of training provision is 
769 (95%CI = 612 to 925). 
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Table 5: Summary of study findings (RAS for each associated variable) 
Variable (quantity) Mean (SD) Median IQR 95% CI p-value 
Year assessed 
2001 (2) 543 (24) 543 535 - 552 331 - 756 
0.083 
2002 (9) 678 (93) 680 605 - 748 607 - 749 
2003 (7) 732 (164) 771 735 - 822 580 - 883 
2004 (9) 620 (167) 610 440 - 722 492 - 748 
2005 (12) 686 (90) 702 626 - 734 628 - 743 
2006 (12) 606 (196) 671 442 - 740 482 - 730 
2007 (13) 511 (207) 503 318 - 736 386 - 636 
2008 (18) 704 (166) 755 628 - 824 621 - 787 
2009 (11) 524 (196) 504 429 - 672 393 - 656 
2010 (4) 660 (134) 660 598 - 721 446 - 873 
2011 (6) 589 (257) 596 389 - 816 320 - 859 
Operating age of the facility1 
< 1 yr (11) 449 (272) 405 211 - 652 266 - 632 
0.117 1-5 yrs (32)  635 (154) 656 552 - 747 579 - 690 
>  5 yrs (54) 620 (168) 680 503 - 743 574 - 665 
Type of treatment protocols (maximum treatment depth) available at the facility2 
Up to 300kPa (abs) (15) 494 (248) 503 290 - 739 357 - 631 
0.020 Up to 400kPa (abs) (16) 535 (188) 556 420 - 652 435 - 635 
Up to 600kPa (abs) (90) 640 (168) 684 509 - 761 605 - 675 
Type of chamber installed in the facility 
Monoplace (10) 414 (253) 378 207 - 643 234 - 595 0.005 
Multiplace (95) 641 (167) 683 513 - 767 607 - 675 
Referral rating or category of the facility 
A3 (13) 448 (118) 476 435 - 552 390 - 544 
<0.001 
B4 (31) 611 (229) 725 445 - 775 527 - 695 
C5 (48) 640 (150) 680 531 - 738 597 - 684 
D6 (4) 575 (144) 579 519 - 635 346 - 805 
E7 (6) 820 (52) 827 799 - 853 766 - 874 
F8 (3) 767 (51) 757 739 - 789 641 - 893 
Availability of the facility to manage diving injuries
Available 24/7 (54) 554 (181) 570 443 - 708 505 - 604 
<0.001 Office hours (41) 660 (170) 725 610 - 751 607 - 714 
Closed (10) 802 (120) 851 827 - 864 716 - 888 
Utilization of the facility (number of patients per annum) 
< 5 pts (23) 719 (109) 736 669 - 782 672 - 766 
<0.001 5-50 pts (50) 585 (183) 618 444 - 745 533 - 637 
> 50 pts (22) 511 (189) 556 411 - 667 427 - 595 
Reliability of the facility 
Reliable (93) 597 (184) 628 486 - 743 559 - 635 <0.001 
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Variable (quantity) Mean (SD) Median IQR 95% CI p-value 
Unreliable (12)  790 (112) 845 732 - 860 719 - 861 
Sustainability of the facility 
Sustainable (87) 589 (187) 626 471 - 736 549 - 629 <0.001 
Unsustainable (18) 766 (108) 782 736 - 857 713 - 820 
Medical supervision: availability of a doctor for the facility 
Full-time doctor (72) 585 (193) 630 463 - 738 540 - 631 
0.013 On-call doctor (28) 683 (151) 730 553 - 822 625 - 742 
No doctor (5) 752 (161) 853 688 - 859 553 - 952 
Staff training provided to staff members 
Formal (24) 404 (185) 371 272 - 495 326 - 482 
<0.001 Informal (75) 676 (131) 717 586 - 772 646 - 706 
No training (6) 769 (149) 851 728 - 857 612 - 925 
1  8 facilities had never operated and were excluded from the analysis in this table 
2 Some facilities have the capability to treat at 400kPa and 600 kPa
3 A: Hospital-based facilities, with in-chamber advanced life support capabilities. 
4 B: Hospital-based facilities with no in-chamber advanced life support capabilities. 
5 C: Non-hospital based facilities allowing treatments at absolute pressures exceeding 300kPa (abs).
6 D: Non-hospital based facilities allowing oxygen treatments only.
7 E: Facilities where a restriction applied due to safety concerns and referral to such facilities were not 
recommended at the time of assessment. 
8 F: Facilities that were not considered safe at the time of the assessment where no treatments should 
be provided. 
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Regression analysis: 
The final linear regression model used four factors, namely (1) the type of chamber installed, 
(2) the number of patients treated per year, (3) the training received by staff members and (4) 
the availability of the facility to treat diving emergencies** to predict the RAS. The model 
yielded an adjusted R-squared value of 0.541, with the F-test indicating a significance level 
of <0.001.  The final model is described in Table 6.   
The ANOVA table for the model is provided as Table 7. 
Table 6: Multiple linear regression model to predict the RAS 
 Coefficient Standard Error t P > |t| 95% CI 
Chamber type  
(Reference: monoplace)      
Multiplace 144.7 49.7 2.91 0.004 46.1 – 243.2 
Both mono- & multiplace 77.3 101.0 0.77 0.446 -123.1 – 277.7 
Number of patients treated 
(Reference > 50 patients/year)      
5-50 patients/year 79.5 32.8 2.42 0.017 14.4 – 144.5 
< 5 patients/year 154.8 38.8 3.99 0.000 77.9 – 231.8 
(not yet operational) 303.7 71.5 4.35 0.000 161.7 – 445.7 
Staff training  
(Reference: formal)      
Informal training 194.4 32.9 5.91 0.000 129.1 – 259.7 
No training 110.9 88.3 1.25 0.213 -64.5 – 286.2 
Chamber availability  
(Reference: available 24/7)      
Available office hours 81.3 27.6 2.95 0.004 26.5 – 136.1 
Closed 0 (omitted)    
Constant 209.3 54.4 3.85 0.000 101.3 – 317.3 
 
Table 7: ANOVA table for the regression model 
Source Sum of 
squares 
Degrees of 
freedom Mean square F-value Prob > F 
Model 2111065.75 8 263883.22 16.36 0.0000 
Residual 1548871.26 96 16134.08   
Total 3659937.02 104 35191.70   
 
                                                            
** The sub-group of the predictor “Chamber availability” that was coded as “closed” (for facilities that were 
closed during the time of the assessment) was omitted from the model because of collinearity. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
General 
This study provides a unique and valuable insight on leading safety concerns encountered 
during the assessment of a large portion of hyperbaric facilities used primarily for the 
treatment of recreational divers around the world. These safety concerns were carefully 
defined as distinct risk elements for the purpose of the analysis.   
It is noteworthy that the results contain what could be considered to be population data rather 
than only reporting sample data. This is due to the fact that the global population of 
hyperbaric facilities eligible for assessment is approximately 160 of which 105 (i.e., 66%) 
were assessed. The narrow 95%CI range for several RS and RAS and their associated factors 
illustrates this statistically.  
As indicated in Table 3, this review covered a wide, international area and the data had a very 
high degree of completeness. As all the assessments were made by the investigator using the 
same Risk Assessment Guide, there was no inter-rater variability to consider.  
Risk scores associated with the respective risk elements 
One of the primary outcomes of this review was the determination of a suitable risk scores 
(RS’s) for each of the risk elements across the range of facilities assessed.  The RS was 
developed specifically to overcome many of the deficiencies identified in former guidelines. 
Many of these were effective in recording non-compliances (NC’s) but failed to determine 
their impact on overall safety. The absolute number of NC’s does not accurately indicate the 
overall safety implications of the respective NC’s for any given facility. Therefore the various 
relevant hazards (risk elements), identified as NC’s by consistently applying the Risk 
Assessment Guide, were weighted for their potential impact on safety. Moreover, NC’s do 
not occur in isolation; they also have implications across risk element subdivisions: For 
instance, the technical section contains certain maintenance and quality-related issues as 
listed in Table 1. Similarly, certain management items reflected not only on the safety but 
also the quality of the medical practice evident at the assessed facilities. Accordingly, the 
categorizations by risk element subdivisions are not definitive of safety or quality and RS 
values should be used instead. 
As described in the methodology, the RS values can be used to allow comparisons and to 
determine trends based on the associated factors (variables) selected.  However, there are also 
important limitations to using the RS values:  The RS is a relative score. Therefore, the data 
must be interpreted and applied with caution. The RS cannot predict absolute risk nor the 
incidence rate of a specific accident associated with a NC. However, the RS can rank NC’s in 
terms of their relative importance to safety status across the population of hyperbaric 
facilities to which it is applied. As such, the RS provides a good indication of a duly weighted 
and considered risk by incorporating likelihood and severity as well as how often these occur 
in the field.  This provides a relative measure against the other hazards listed and allows the 
common safety concerns to be identified readily in order of highest RS. Consequently, a 
higher RS score indicates the presence of a relatively greater number of relevant hazards (risk 
elements) which can prompt appropriate intervention as well as providing a foundation for 
ongoing quality assurance. Hence, instead of making arbitrary recommendations, the RS data 
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provides greater objectivity for the development of targeted safety initiatives and future 
guidance documents to address such risks.   
Table 1 above describes the relevant hazards (risk elements) at the assessed facilities. It 
provides data on the occurrence (crude number) of each of the relevant hazards over the full 
spectrum of assessed facilities, the frequency of occurrence (percentage of the full data set), 
and the weighted risk (RS) associated with each of these elements.  
The RS values follow a normal distribution pattern, as shown in Figure 1, with mean of 12 
(SD 9, 95%CI = 10 to 14) versus a median of 11(IQR = 14). 
Table 2 illustrates the general trend away from technical concerns, towards those involving 
the human interface and attention. 
The descriptive list of relevant hazards provides a comprehensive view of the complexity of a 
hyperbaric facility. It also indicates that the effective and safe running of a facility requires a 
multi-disciplinary approach. In addition, a range of skills is required to address and mitigate 
the various risk elements that exist. However, the scoring system does provide objective 
guidance on which areas require immediate intervention, and which may possibly be dealt 
with using other mitigating techniques. 
It is of interest to note that the most common safety concerns were made up of 10 risk 
elements. Not surprisingly, these included management-, technical- and maintenance 
subdivisions. 
There were only 3 purely technical items amongst the top 10. The remaining 7 were all linked 
to human interactions.  This reinforces the point that, for the most part, safety is determined 
by the medical doctor and the operational team. The exception would be where the technical 
components are intrinsically unsafe such as may be the case with faulty or sub-standard 
equipment or installation procedures. 
Associated factors 
One of the benefits of assigning a risk assessment score (RAS) to each of the hyperbaric 
facilities is that it permitted other variables (unrelated to NC’s or Risk Elements) to be 
analysed that might be associated with a given RAS. Those associated factors appeared to be 
predictive are discussed below as well as those where an association was anticipated but not 
found.  
Region:  
The assessed facilities covered 105 facilities located in 42 countries in popular recreational 
diving regions.  The results were tabulated per country, with both NC’s and RAS values 
indicated as the mean (median) values per county in order to reflect geographical trends.  
The results for the total data set indicated an average number of 37 ±12 NC’s at the facilities.  
The average RAS (taken over all facilities) was 619 ±188 and the median RAS value was 
680, with an IQR of 259.  These values provide suitable comparators when considering the 
results from the actual countries. 
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A review of the association between region and RAS produced counterintuitive findings: The 
general assertion is that developing countries would be expected to have a greater number of 
NC’s, and thus a higher RAS. However, even a basic review of geography versus the average 
number of NC’s per facility within a given region clearly revealed that this is not necessarily 
the case.  Even when the NC’s were weighted to produce the RAS, the pattern remained the 
same. As such, it would appear that location is not necessarily a good indicator of safety 
status or awareness. Indeed, there are facilities in developed countries where the NC’s and 
RAS values were well above the mean and median values – Germany (48 NC’s and an RAS 
of 787) being an example.  In contrast, there were facilities in developing countries, such as 
Tanzania (Zanzibar), where the converse was true: 19 NC’s listed and an RAS of 309. 
A careful review of the raw data revealed two possible confounding factors that could explain 
the apparent paradox: 
 Many popular diving locations lie within developing countries.  Treatment facilities 
are sometimes installed at these sites by diving, medical and resort organisations to 
specifically assure and attract affluent visitors. Thus an artificial situation may arise 
where the quality of professional medical and technical support at a given dive site 
exceeds that in the adjacent parts of the country. 
 In some developed countries, chambers are established by private clubs catering to 
injured divers only, whereas in many developing countries, these facilities are located 
in formal healthcare facilities, offering primarily clinical hyperbaric oxygen therapy 
(HBO) treatments with the treatment of diving illnesses being regarded as secondary. 
Although additional subgroup analyses (along the lines of referral ratings followed by 
determination of the actual location) may refine regional categorizations, these trends were 
not readily apparent to the investigator. As such it does not appear meaningful or realistic to 
stratify eligible Hyperbaric Facilities by region in order to predict their safety status.   
Year assessed: 
Based on the RAS, there did not appear to be any significant difference as the assessment 
process progressed over time – see Figure 2. This variable was specifically selected as an 
indicator of process maturity and intra-rater variability: to determine whether there was any 
degree of either over-reporting or stricter classification of NC’s by the investigator during the 
actual site assessment stages. 
There is a wide degree of overlap of the 95% confidence intervals, spanning the entire 
assessment period. Future investigative analysis using more than just the year of assessment 
and RAS might indicate other influences. 
This subject is also covered under Strength and Weaknesses later in this discussion, but the 
assessment process does not appear to have been significantly affected by investigator 
inconsistency.  
Operating age:  
The data set shows that the greatest number of facilities assessed were those that were well-
established, providing a basis for comparison (54 facilities had been in operation for 5 or 
more years). 
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The results indicate that the younger the facility, the better the apparent record of safety 
findings – see Figure 3.  The youngest group (n = 11), in operation for less than one year, 
indicate a RASmean of 449 compared to the overall value of 619. Facilities in operation longer 
than 5 years indicate a RASmean of 621, above the overall average of 619, but lower than the 
median value of 680.  The RASmedian for this subset compares well with the overall median 
value for the data set: 682 vs. 680. 
However, these findings should be interpreted with caution, since the findings were not 
statistically significant (p = 0.117).  It is thus unclear whether this finding would apply to the 
population of chambers not yet assessed. 
Many of the risk mitigation strategies (and hence the impact of risk weightings) depend on 
the human interface rather than purely on engineering controls.  Most hyperbaric facilities are 
engineered to a safe standard (in accordance with national and international codes and 
standards).22, 26, 27, 59-62 Human factors and ad hoc modifications may still render the system 
unsafe as a whole, however. As such, an expectation might exist that older facilities would 
indicate either a greater level of maturity and competence (less non-compliances) or a greater 
level of negligence or complacency (more non-compliances) with the latter having a greater 
impact on the RAS than maturity. The progressive escalation in the RAS values over time in 
operation appears to support this: facilities in operation for less than one year showed the 
lowest RAS value (mean or median value), whereas the more established facilities had higher 
RAS values. 
Treatment protocols offered (scope of services):  
Although the trend line in Figure 4 suggests an increase in the RAS with the progression from 
shallower, shorter treatment tables towards more complicated deeper protocols being offered, 
the results were not statistically significant, since the 95% confidence intervals overlap.  This 
is likely due to a lack of power to detect the difference: Although infrequently, most 
multiplace facilities (n=90) recorded offering treatment tables up to an absolute pressure of 
600kPa. This left only a small number of facilities in the shallower treatment groups of which 
5 were multiplace and 10 were monoplace-only facilities. Whereas multiplace facilities may 
elect to limit treatments to 300kPa, monoplace facilities are technically incapable of 
exceeding 300kPa. As such, a confounding association between chamber type and treatment 
pressure may have biased the data, justifying an additional subgroup analysis. However, 
given (1) the small number of purely monoplace chamber facilities (n=10); (2) the fact that 
they are not favoured for the treatment of injured divers due to their restrictions on treatment 
pressure as well as the inability to perform sequential neurological assessments during 
treatment; and (3) the fact that there was a comparable number of multiplace facilities who 
also did not perform treatments in excess of 300kPa, this analysis proved to be unnecessary.  
When the data was analysed by means of non-parametric methods (Kruskal-Wallis), a 
significant difference is found (p = 0.020). 
The RAS is expected to be higher with more complex treatments on offer. The offering of the 
basic < 300kPa US Navy Treatment Table 6 (sometimes referred to as the “long oxygen 
table”) represents the lowest overall risk rating: RASmean of 515 for this group against the 
overall mean of 619 (median 680) for all facilities. 
One explanation is that higher pressures represent greater exposure to risk.  Pressure, 
operational complexity, training requirements and equipment reliability are all typical areas 
of concern. This topic is somewhat controversial because some facilities and proponents 
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claim that deeper treatment depths are more effective in treating residual paralysis.63, 64 
Equally, there are those querying these claims65 or, after reviewing their own outcomes at 
deeper pressures, concluding that did not seem to be the case66. 
The 600kPa protocol (specifically the US Navy Treatment Table 6A) was developed 
specifically for the treatment of arterial gas embolism67.  However, and specifically related to 
this study, there are assertions by experienced clinicians that the risk of allowing patients and 
even staff to enter a saturation condition due to complications in returning from depth renders 
these treatment protocols unrealistic and possibly even dangerous.68, 69 These safety 
considerations clearly weigh heavily against the unproven, anecdotally-proven benefits and 
there is an increasing trend to discourage the use of 600kPa protocols. 
Type of chamber: 
Traditionally, diver treatment chambers have been multi-lock (multiplace) chambers, based 
on standard commercial diving practices.   
With the rapid growth of clinical hyperbaric medicine, and the commensurate rise in the 
placement of less costly, smaller and more resource-manageable single lock (monoplace) 
chambers, these devices have steadily made inroads into the effective treatment of most types 
of diving injuries.70  A typical diver treatment facility is unlikely to be furnished with a 
monoplace chamber, with some exceptions; however, in some locations, a clinically focussed 
monoplace facility is called in to treat injured divers.  There are actually a few monoplace 
facilities dedicated to treating divers, but these are less than 5 in number.   
A discussion regarding the efficacy or appropriateness of this equipment choice is beyond the 
scope of this study and in any event, this decision remains the responsibility of the treating 
medical doctor.  However, it is interesting to note that based on this review, a monoplace 
chamber facility returns a lower RAS at a mean value of 414 (95%CI = 234 to 595), well 
below the mean of the whole sample studied (RASmean = 619); while multiplace facilities 
globally exceed this mean value at a RASmean of 641 (95%CI = 607 to 675). 
There are published advantages and disadvantages to both mono- and multiplace chambers.70, 
71 Yet judging by the RAS outcomes alone, a strong case could be made that a monoplace is a 
“safer” option to the referring medical doctor, despite the historical preferences for 
multiplace chambers. However, the selection of a referral facility is not made on the basis of 
safety. Intervention by personnel is limited in a monoplace facility as is the performance of 
serial assessments mentioned previously. Indeed, in reality there are also many other 
contributing factors to consider, especially when considering facilities located in more remote 
areas. Another example is the addition of life-support equipment. The presence of such 
equipment may increase the RAS score, yet at the same time, this would be an essential 
consideration in managing certain clinical situations. 
Referral rating:  
As a general trend, RAS scores increase the further the hyperbaric facility is located away 
from a hospital and the closer it is to the dive site – refer to Figure 5.  
The first 4 allocations (A, B, C & D: referring to the section Variables, under Study 
methodology) were not intended to differentiate in terms of safety; these refer solely to the 
scope of services, location and availability of advance life-support capabilities.  The ratings E 
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and F are generally very carefully decided upon, as the presence, knowledge, training and 
experience of the presiding medical doctor plays a key role here. It is conceivable that a poor 
chamber with a good doctor is still a suitable referral centre whereas an excellent chamber 
without an appropriate practitioner is a greater hazard. 
The trend of increasing RAS was statistically significant (p<0.001) and the large difference in 
RAS between the first 4 ratings (A though D) and the last 2 (E & F) concurs with the decision 
to regard these as “unsafe”.  The trend allows for a good degree of prediction of the likely 
safety status, based on the siting of a hyperbaric facility, making it extremely useful as a 
referral instrument.  This referral rating system is now in use by the Divers Alert Network to 
indicate to the referring doctor whether a facility is suitable or appropriate for referral of an 
injured diver.  
Availability of services:  
This indicator delineates between facilities available for diving emergencies (open all hours, 
all days or 24/7) and those with a more clinical, outpatient market or 8-to-5 focus. 
The RAS values are significantly different between all groups, with 24/7 facilities clearly 
showing the lowest RAS (p<0.001). See also Figure 6 for the increasing RAS value as the 
availability diminishes.  The majority of the facilities, 54 of the 105, are open on a 24/7 basis 
and the results reveal show that such facilities have the lowest RASmean (554 vs. 619 for all 
facilities).  
The RAS for a 24/7 facility is also influenced by additional safety considerations, such as 
increased staffing requirements, levels of system redundancy, greater gas supplies and power 
reserves. To some extent, this implies that a higher RAS should be expected. The result is 
likely indicative of increased commitment and interest by the facility staff in dealing with 
diving emergencies; a primary influence in safety awareness and practices. 
Utilisation:  
A higher utilisation predicts a safer operating environment (p<0.001).  The increased use of a 
facility impacts directly on the financial sustainability of the facility, as well as the 
commitment by staff and familiarisation of staff with equipment – see Figure 3. 
An optimal situation is where diver treatments exceed one per week (50+ per year), ensuring 
that all staff remain familiar with their skills and practices, and that the owners receive 
sufficient income to provide for proper resources, maintenance and support.  
Reliability:  
The system reliability, dichotomised as yes or no, was based on the evidenced maintenance 
regimen. A well-structured and effective maintenance program was considered as sufficient 
to ensure a reliable facility.  The measure was indicated simply as whether or not the facility 
equipment was deemed to be reliable, notwithstanding other factors, such as sustainability, 
medical supervision, age or regional location. The direct result was that a high number of 
reliable facilities emerged (93 out of 105 qualifying results) with an acceptable level of 
reliability. 
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A statistically significant difference was found between the RAS of facilities that were 
deemed reliable and those that were not (p<0.001): better maintenance, greater reliability, 
lower RAS. 
However, reliability and safety are not synonymous. Some reliable facilities may have 
significant safety issues. As such there is the possibility of including less safety-conscious 
facilities in the overall mix if reliability is used as a predictor of safety.  Once again, it is 
conceivable that an experienced diving medical practitioner can manage with a suboptimal 
facility, while the converse is not true. 
Sustainability:  
The determination of this variable was subjective, following the opinion of the investigator 
and based on knowledge gained of funding (origins), ownership (whether this was stable or 
changed frequently), income generation and utilisation, prevailing market forces in the 
region, and also stability and permanence of staff. However, the perception of risk (at the 
time of the evaluation of the facility) did not play a role in this classification.   
It was thus interesting to find that sustainable facilities clearly showed significant differences 
in RAS values (p<0.001) to non-sustainable facilities.  This may be explained by the 
proposition that unsustainable facilities would be less willing or able to address safety 
concerns.  
Medical supervision:  
The presence of an appropriately trained doctor was used as the determinant for this variable. 
The results were plotted as having either a full time, on-call or completely absent doctor on 
site. Figure 8 indicates the strong relationship between diminishing medical supervision and 
an increase in RAS values.  Due to the small number of facilities (n=5) involved in the 
category where no doctor is available, the 95% confidence intervals overlap.  However, 
appropriately using non-parametric methods to compare the groups (Kruskal-Wallis), a 
statistically significant difference is found (p=0.013).  This is indicative of an increased 
health and safety risk associated with the absence of a dedicated doctor.  This does not reflect 
on treatment efficacy, but this absence of a doctor would certainly be deemed unsafe in many 
countries, as well as making for inappropriate referral centres for any organisations engaged 
in providing remote medical advice. 
There is a general understanding that clinical hyperbaric oxygen therapy requires a doctor 
present whereas commercial diving operations who provide recompression to their employees 
do not.59, 72 This leaves facilities treating injured recreational divers a bit in limbo. It is rarely 
financially rewarding for medical practitioners to be involved in facilities that offer 
infrequent treatments, thus there is a tendency for these facilities to have on-call coverage by 
default. Busy facilities almost invariably have a doctor present for the opposite reason. 
In some cases, facilities might argue that an on-call only doctor is sufficient, implying that 
the doctor would assess all patients, but only appear at the facility where deemed necessary 
either by the actual condition of the patient, or in an emergency declared by the operating 
staff. This is often the case where codes and standards are misquoted or misunderstood, for 
example where the doctor is “on call” but has to be present within 3 minutes of being 
called.22 
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In some extreme cases, specifically where primarily hosted by commercial diving companies, 
facilities did not believe that a doctor was needed and that a commercial “diver medic” could 
perform the required recompression therapies.73 This attitude still prevails amongst certain of 
the older generation of chamber operators.  
Training: 
Three categories of training were considered in the evaluation of this variable as an indicator 
of potential safety.  These included formally certified staff, complying with the requirements 
established by either nationally and internationally recognised staff training systems; staff 
who had received documented training, but where this was limited to on-site or “on-the-job” 
training on the specific equipment and provided by in-house staff members; and facilities 
where staff had received no formal or documented training. 
The results indicate a statistically significant trend (see Figure 9) where facilities employing 
staff trained and certified to recognised standards yielded lower RAS values (p<0.001).  It is 
however interesting to find no statistically significant difference between informal (on-the-
job) training and having no training available at all.  This may again be related to a lack of 
power to detect a difference.   
One would expect that a lack in instruction would render staff less aware of the hazards and 
the consequences of both actions and omissions, and lead to a less safe working environment.  
Notably however, both differ significantly from the RAS in facilities where formal training is 
offered.  This is indicative that formal training has a significant effect on the safety of a 
facility.  Training is in fact mandated by most of the relevant national standards22, 59, 61, 72 and 
recommended codes of practice or guidelines8, 25-27 issued by national hyperbaric 
organisations. 
General:  
A trend noted in all assessment results, and determined subjectively although corroborated by 
the data above, is that the safety status, awareness and overall culture is influenced to a 
greater degree by staff interest, commitment, awareness, training, medical support and 
leadership. On a global mean, purely technical, infra-structural or even financial issues play a 
lesser role in rendering a facility safe.  
The linear regression model 
A significant linear relationship was found between the RAS and the predicting (explanatory) 
variables.  When using this model, the coefficient of multiple determination of the RAS (i.e., 
the R2) was 54% using only four variables.  The other associated factors described in this 
thesis were tested for inclusion in the model, but did not yield a better fit.  This is likely due 
to collinearity between the variables.  For instance, the “referral category” variable 
(indicating whether a facility is linked to a hospital or serve as a stand-alone facility) would 
be adequately predicted by the “facility availability” variable that is included in the model, 
since in-hospital facilities will typically be available on a 24/7 basis, while more rural 
facilities would tend to be less available.  Another factor playing a role is the small sub-
groups contained in some of the variables. 
Although the model can be used to predict a RAS of a facility based on these factors, it 
should be stressed again that such a score should be interpreted with caution, since (in and of 
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itself) it does not have any predictive value, other than the ability to rank the facility in terms 
of relative safety compared to facilities already assessed. 
Four typical hyperbaric facility examples are used to illustrate the use of this model: 
 A new monoplace chamber, which is available on a 24/7 basis, treating more than 
fifty patients per year, employing formally trained staff, will have a predicted RAS of 
209. Table 8 below contains the results of the application of the linear model. 
Table 8: Example 1:  New hospital-based monoplace chamber facility  
 Coefficient Standard error t P > |t| 95% CI 
RAS 209.3 54.4 3.85 0.000 101.3 – 317.3 
 A new multiplace chamber, available on an out-patient, office-hours basis, treating 
more than 50 patients per year, employing informally trained staff, will have a 
predicted RAS of 630. Table 9 below contains the results of the linear model. 
Table 9: Example 2: New out-patient based multiplace chamber facility 
 Coefficient Standard error t P > |t| 95% CI 
RAS 629.7 31.5 19.97 0.000 567.1 – 692.3 
 A new multiplace chamber, based outside a hospital on an office-hour basis, treating 
between 5 – 50 patients per year, employing formally trained staff, will have a 
predicted RAS of 515. Table 10 below contains the results of the linear model. 
Table 10: Example 3: New out-patient based multiplace chamber facility 
 Coefficient Standard error t P > |t| 95% CI 
RAS 514.7 38.5 13.36 0.000 438.3 – 591.2 
 A new multiplace chamber, open office-hours only, treating less than 5 patients per 
year and with informally trained staff will have a predicted RAS of 785.  Table 11 
below contains the results of the linear model. 
Table 11: Example 4: New office-hour multiplace chamber 
 Coefficient Standard error t P > |t| 95% CI 
RAS 784.5 30.1 26.02 0.000 724.7 – 844.4 
Strengths and weaknesses 
This study has the following strengths: 
A significant amount of data was recorded from the facility assessments, collated consistently 
(single evaluator) using the Risk Assessment Guide, and containing a high degree of 
completeness.5, 8 This meant a low degree of missing data.  There was a wide geographical 
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spread, covering the majority of popular diving regions.  The comprehensive coverage of all 
similar facilities world-wide (>66%), implies that a significant portion of the total population 
was included. Finally, this study is a first of its kind, with original data. 
However, the study results may be subject to biases and confounding factors that have not 
been quantified.  Four primary sources of potential bias have been identified, namely:   
Non-randomness:  The assessment program did not include all hyperbaric facilities. It was 
extensive and estimated to have included around 66% of all recreational diver recompression 
facilities located close to or within reasonable range of recreational diving sites around the 
world. Nevertheless this attributes a non-randomness to the data. However, in mitigation of 
this potential bias, the sites were selected primarily on the basis of strategic value to a region 
and expressed interest by both the medical director and the diver assistance organisations 
active within the various geographical regions. The sites were not selected by the investigator 
and hence bias should not be inferred in this. 
Excluded geographic regions: While over 66% of recreational diving treatment facilities have 
been assessed, regional areas such as Asia Pacific†† and the Japanese diving region are not 
included in this analysis.  Fortunately, these regions have a low number of facilities included 
in them.  The non-inclusion of these facilities is a result of regional diving-safety political 
restrictions and is not based on the expected safety status or condition of the facilities.  
Furthermore, the investigator has visited several facilities in these regions, although not being 
permitted to formally assess them, and continually fields questions from facilities in these 
regions.  He has observed that as a rule, international standards have been applied to 
equipment and practices, trends in terms of education, maintenance, safety awareness and 
equipment condition represent those elsewhere in the world, and that the issues that are raised 
are the same as those raised elsewhere.  While there was no practical way to address this 
regional bias, no data anomalies are expected to result from this regional exclusion. 
 
Personal bias: The investigator has performed all of the assessments under review as the 
main assessor.  Where assistant assessors were present, their input was limited to data 
gathering or interaction with staff regarding operating procedures, medical case management 
or staff training issues. This implies a potential for bias in how the relative importance of 
non-compliant issues was regarded, and whether in fact these were regarded as a realistic 
source of risk when considering the entire operating condition of a facility.  For example, a 
facility with a high degree of equipment specification, externally trained and certified staff, 
effective and consistent maintenance practices and well developed emergency procedures, 
was less likely to have safety issues with regard to inappropriate or uncertified medical 
equipment being used inside the chamber.  The apparent safety culture evident at a facility 
played a direct role in whether non-compliances were rated as significant, for 
recommendation or a comment only. This was a judgment call made by the investigator 
based on his 18 years’ experience in this field.  The bias affects rating of non-compliances as 
well as whether these were even listed. 
However, in such cases, the incomplete reporting was likely offset by the greatly reduced 
probability of significantly negative consequences. This was done using a classical definition 
                                                            
†† Asia Pacific includes countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific Rim islands, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Vietnam. The estimate of recreational diver treatment facilities in these regions, based on data obtained 
from dive safety organisations and recompression chamber networks, is approximately 30. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   Page 52 of 59 
of “risk” as being the likelihood that the exposure to a hazard will lead to negative 
consequences. 
Process maturity:  As the assessments were conducted over an extensive, 13 year period, both 
the assessor (in this case, the investigator) as well as the process would have undergone 
various maturations. As such there were increases in efficiency, a reduction in the over-
representation of risks in some cases, and a subconscious tendency to focus more quickly on 
recurrent issues. The effect of this maturity on the data could potentially introduce a degree of 
inconsistency in the assessment of risks during earlier site assessments, together with the 
regarding of some risk issues as being less significant as a better understanding of the 
background and likelihood of negative consequences developed.  However, the investigator 
did have all the appropriate and accurately captured conformance indicators in the body of 
the reports and thus had access to source data that lies outside of the summarised findings at 
the end of the reports.  Thus at the time of the review, for the purpose of this thesis, all data 
could be reassessed as raw data with a high level of consistency. In addition, other sources of 
data (personal notes, photographs, etc.) were also used to verify compliances and non-
compliances.  It should also be noted that this study was not intended to provide an absolute 
measure of risks, or a statement of safety at any facility.  The impact on the common 
concerns was hence unlikely to be of significance. 
The year of assessment was captured in the raw data set.  An analysis of the RAS values 
indicated no difference in scores over time.  This is indicative that even though process 
maturity may have taken place, the way in which the information was captured for the 
purposes of this study was consistent.   
Sensitivity analysis 
Where absolute values are important, or where values are to be compared with data from 
other assessments, reports or studies, a sensitivity analysis is usually required to determine 
the effect of any investigator (assessor) inaccuracy or imprecision.  Clearly when allocating a 
risk score in terms of probability and consequence, the investigator would absolutely rely on 
in-depth personal knowledge of how this would apply to a NC.  However, two reasons are 
submitted as to why a sensitivity analysis was not deemed necessary: 
 De-identification: The final scoring and the application of the weighting system to the 
scores was done using the de-identified list and did not rely on knowledge of the 
individual facilities, but rather only the understanding of how the relevant hazard (risk 
element) could be scored in terms of probability and consequence. Hence no bias or 
altered rating to any facility could be implied. The outcome would thus treat all 
facilities equally. 
 Accuracy: The actual accuracy of final risk assessment scores is not critically 
important. The primary goal in obtaining a score is simply to prioritise NC’s and 
hence to extract the most common NC’s that have a direct impact on facility safety, as 
well as prioritising individual RAS’s in order to rank facilities relative to each other. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions  
Hyperbaric facilities exist in a range of forms, from formally-established, hospital-based units 
in well-developed regions through to basic ex-commercial diving chambers in remote, 
popular diving spots. 
This review of 105 such facilities, over an extensive, 13 year period, was able to determine 
the most common safety concerns together with the associated factors that have an influence 
on the overall safety status of these treatment facilities. By applying the Risk Assessment 
Guide to produce risk scores related to non-compliances, risk assessment scores could be 
derived for each hyperbaric facility.   
Importantly, these scores made provision for a linear regression analysis to identify 
associated factors upon which a predictive model could be based. The latter now allows for 
the likely risk profile of any hyperbaric facility relative to the other facilities within the global 
population, while using only four of the associated variables. 
The outcome of the determination of individual risk scores was the ranking of these to 
determine those that play the most significant role in establishing the overall risk assessment 
score of hyperbaric facilities.  This study produced a means to empower referring medical 
practitioners to be able to make more informed decisions on the likely safety status of a 
hyperbaric facility, even where such a facility is truly remote and in an inaccessible part of 
the world. By doing so, it may be anticipated that injured divers may receive better care with 
fewer complications.  
This work has established an important foundation upon which further research may be built. 
It has unmasked and ranked the salient risk elements in a way that they may be studied 
further.  It also provides safety directors and medical directors with a prioritised outline for 
ongoing quality assurance and safety improvement.  
Two offerings are rendered in final conclusion.   
 Human interaction is the most important variable in determining safety: This study 
projects the clear message that despite the usual assumption that safety is dependent 
on the technical or engineered aspects of any facility, the most essential contributors 
to safety are all the human interactions including management, administration and 
operation of the facility. This conclusion is based on the findings in this report as well 
as reviews of accidents.7 Safety lies directly within the control and capability of those 
that manage and operate the facility: once a facility has been properly established it 
rarely needs a highly technical mind to provide safety assurance. 
 Failure to plan produces planned failure: The second, related in the sense that it is the 
creed of the engineer, but also the adage taught to all SA Navy candidate officers 
during training in 1984 and echoed in numerous medico-legal reviews, states that 
those that fail to plan, plan to fail! What better illustrates this point than having the 
highest risk score attributed to the failure to practice safety drills – it is too late to 
realise during a real emergency that the plan was doomed to failure! 
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Chapter 6: Recommendations 
Two areas of consideration for additional studies, research and analysis include the 
refinement of the scoring system and the associated variables. 
Further areas for analytical studies: 
Neither the risk scores nor the risk assessment scores are absolute values. This remains the 
ultimate objective, however – the determination of absolute risk. Nevertheless, in this study, 
risk scores and risk assessment scores were used to rank safety concerns and hence to 
develop guidance for prediction and where due attention should be paid to improve safety.  
Taking this further towards quantitative analysis techniques to derive absolute values for risk 
might allow accurate prediction of incidence rates for specific accidents related to identified 
safety concerns. Unlike the aviation industry, hyperbaric medicine is not driven by the same 
economic impetus nor the same level of public insistence on near-absolute safety. As such, it 
may prove to be impractical to derive absolute risk given the paucity of chambers and the 
relative scarcity of accidents. 
Several of the associated variables were not deemed significant enough due to size of sub-
groups, or were excluded due to potential collinearity between the variables.  This does not 
mean to suggest the absence of any other factors. Therefore, these variables could be 
explored and refined further in order to improve the adjusted R-squared value as well as to 
refine the basis of referrals or deferrals in favour of evacuation to another facility.  
Lastly, other significant associated factors may become apparent during future assessments, 
such that the R-squared value may be raised above the present 54% mark.   
Development of guidance based on risk scores: 
The study has enabled the actual hyperbaric facility risks or safety concerns to be examined 
and ranked. This has provided a range of items that can be researched and studied further 
with the objective of providing medical directors or even users or facility owners with 
practical ways to mitigate and suitably address these concerns. 
The following five safety concerns, listed in decreasing order (i.e., by magnitude of risk score 
in the range 33 to 0), represent key areas that can be studied further to render appropriate 
advice to hyperbaric facilities.  
 Regular emergency drills not carried out. This was rated the most common safety 
concern and was observed at 85% of the assessed facilities, with a safety indicator or 
RS of 33.  Research into the rationale behind the importance of conducting regular 
drills, together with practical guidance on better management of this area of concern, 
would provide those responsible with enhanced confidence in the operation of their 
facilities. 
 No alternative breathing gas device provided for the chamber operator. This carried a 
risk score of 32 and occurred at 87% of the assessed facilities. The intent of this 
requirement is to ensure that in the case of a fire in the facility (but outside the 
chamber) the operator would be able to complete the decompression of the occupants 
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to get them to safety. Clear, established international requirements exist.59, 61 
Nevertheless, this finding rated as the second most common technical safety concern 
at the facilities assessed.  In order to address this effectively, users would need to 
understand the reasoning behind the selection and implementation of suitable 
emergency equipment. 
 Emergency operating & medical procedures not documented. Ranked third, with a 
risk score of 31, this area of non-compliance was common to 78% of the facilities 
assessed.  While medical and operational requirements are generally well described 
and documented in most areas of medicine, legal requirements and ramifications are 
not always obvious or well understood.  This topic requires further research and 
delineation for the responsible medical doctor. 
 Leak testing not done. This returned a risk score of 28 and occurred at 74% of the 
assessed facilities. The appropriate way to facilitate compliance with this safety 
requirement would be to provide researched guidance on the risk rationale together 
with practical, field-appropriate execution methods. 
 Maintenance system absent, inadequate or inappropriate. This was the fifth highest 
safety concern with a risk score of 28; it was observed at 66% of the assessed 
facilities. Further research into the likely causes for this, with suitable managerial and 
safety-related guidance for effective implementation, would provide suitable remedies 
to address this concern. 
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APPENDIX A: Risk weightings 
RISK RATINGS 
 
Probability/likelihood of an event/accident happening 
Fire risk Mechanical risk Health risk 
Combustion definite 5 Failure definite 5 Event definite 5 
Combustion expected 4 Failure expected 4 Event expected 4 
Combustion possible (in theory) 3 Failure possible 3 Event possible 3 
Combustion unusual 2 Failure unusual 2 Event unusual 2 
Combustion unlikely 1 Failure unlikely 1 Event unlikely 1 
 
Severity/consequence of an incident/exposure/event 
Catastrophic (e.g. every chance of death, serious injury or destruction) 5 
Severe (e.g. facility no longer available for treatment or significant injury) 4 
Serious (e.g. reduced ability to treat, affecting treatment quality) 3 
Significant (i.e. minor damage or injury, or extra staff engagement) 2 
Noticeable (i.e. inconvenience & additional work required) 1 
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